LAST WILL-REVISION TO CHALLENGE THE FINDINGS- DELAY

-

LAST WILL-REVISION TO CHALLENGE THE FINDINGS- DELAY


The  revisionary  jurisdiction  INVPKED A  lapse  of  4  months  and  22  days.  Explaining  the  reasons  for  the   delay the  petitioner  states  that  the  wedding  of  his  daughter  was scheduled  to be held on  14  November  2002  and  as  such  he  was busy  preparing  for  the  same  and therefore could not take steps  to  prefer  an  appeal  against  the  said  judgment.  As  the  wife  of the 1st   intervenient-petitioner  was  an  asthmatic  who  also   suffered  from  hypertension  for   a  long  time  and  was  under  constant  medical  care,  the  entire  responsibility  of  arranging  the  wedding  ceremony  was  claimed  to  have  been  shouldered  by  the  1st  intervenient  petitioner petitioner.  In  the  circumstances  he  states that  he  was  unable to  lodge  an  appeal in  time.  Even  if  the  reasons  adduced  are  accepted ,  yet  he  has  to  explain  the  delay  from  14  November  2002  to  17  March  2003  which  nearly  adds  up  to  4  months.  Since  the  petitioner petitioner  has  not  explained  the  delay  for  the  said  period  of  4 months,  the  revision  application  cannot  be  considered  as  having  been  filed  without unnecessary  delay.
It  is  trite  law  that  a has  to  set  out  exceptional  circumstances   warranting  the  intervention  by  way  of  revision.  On  a  reading  of  the  petition,  affidavit  and  other  relevant  documents  if   one  cannot  find  any  such  exceptional  circumstances  the  petitioner  is  not  entitled  to  be  heard  in  revision
*******************************--------*****************************


This is an  application to  revise  the  judgment of the  learned District Judge  of  Bandarawela.  The  facts  briefly  are as follows.  The  petitioner-respondent sought to  prove  the  last  will and  testament  of  his  deceased  father   Andar  Baduge  Richard  Silva  who  died  on  30.08.1999.  In  the  application  for  probate  the  petitioner-respondent  did  not  cite  any  defendants  as  parties  necessary  for  the  adjudication  of  the  matter,  as  the  petitioner  was  the  sole  beneficiary  of  the  last  will.   Upon  the  acceptance of  the  application  for  probate  the  court  issued   notice  of the  action  to  be  published  as  required  by  law  and  the  three  intervenient-petitioners  thereafter  by  application  dated  20th  of  March  2000 intervened  in  the  case, on  the  footing  that  they  are  the  legal  intestate  heirs  of  the deceased.


The  intervenient-petitioners  took up  the  position  that  their  father  died  without  leaving  a  last  Will  and  further  alleged  that  the  last  Will  produced  before  Court  was  not  the  act  and  deed of  their   father  as  it  had  been  obtained   under  duress.  Admittedly  at  the  stage  of  intervention  the  intervenient-petitioners  had  already  filed  an  application  under  reference  No. 22/probate  to  obtain  letters  of  administration  on  the  footing  that  their  father  died  intestate.

However,  as  it  was  necessary  to  resolve the  dispute  as  to  whether  the  deceased  left  a  last  Will  the  learned   district  Judge  has  taken  case  No 23/Probate  for  inquiry.   At  the  said  inquiry  Daniel Siroman Wickramasingha,  Notary Public, an  attesting  witness  of  the  last  Will and  another  person  who  was  said  to  have been present at  the  execution of  the  last will gave evidence.  On  behalf of  the  intervenient-petitioners   the  1st intervenient  petitioner  and  a witness  from  the  railway  department  gave  evidence.  After  the  conclusion of the  trial  the   learned   district  judge  by  his  judgment dated  25th  June  2002  inter  alia held  that  the  Will  sought to be  proved by  the  petitioner respondent  is the act and  deed  of the  deceased  Richard   de  Silva  and  dismissed  the  claim  of  the  intervenient  petitioners.  The  instant  revision  application  has  been  filed  by  the  1st  intervenient  petitioner  invoking  the  revisionary   jurisdiction  of this  Court.

The  intervenient-petitioners  did not  appeal  against the  judgment of the  learned  district judge  but  after the  appealable period  sought the  present  revision  application   to have  the  said  judgment set-aside.  The   judgment  on  the  disputed  question  relating  to  the  Last  will was  delivered  on  25  October  2002.  By  his  judgment   the  learned  district Judge  inter alia  held  that  the  petitioner  had  proved  the  Last  will in  question  and  issued  probate  accordingly.   The  2nd  and  3rd  intervenient-petitioners  neither  appealed  against  the  said  judgment  nor  did  they  invoke  the  revisionary  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  to   challenge  the  validity  of  the  same.  It  is  only  the  1st  intervenient  petitioner  who  sought  to  assail  the  said  judgment.


It  is  significant  to   note  that  the  1st  intervenient-petitioner  thus  invoked  the  revisionary  jurisdiction  of  this  court on  17th  March  2003, after  a  lapse  of  4  months  and  22  days.  Explaining  the  reasons  for  the   delay  in  invoking  the  revisionary  jurisdiction  of  this Court,  the  1st   intervenient  petitioner  states  that  the  wedding  of  his  daughter  was scheduled  to be held on  14  November  2002  and  as  such  he  was busy  preparing  for  the  same  and therefore could not take steps  to  prefer  an  appeal  against  the  said  judgment.  As  the  wife  of the 1st   intervenient-petitioner  was  an  asthmatic  who  also   suffered  from  hypertension  for   a  long  time  and  was  under  constant  medical  care,  the  entire  responsibility  of  arranging  the  wedding  ceremony  was  claimed  to  have  been  shouldered  by  the  1st  intervenient  petitioner petitioner.  In  the  circumstances  he  states that  he  was  unable to  lodge  an  appeal in  time.   


Even  if  the  reasons  thus  adduced  are  accepted  as  plausible  excuse  for  the  delay,  yet  he  has  to  explain  the  delay  from  14  November  2002  to  17  March  2003  which  nearly  adds  up  to  4  months.  Since  the  1st   intervenient  petitioner petitioner  has  not  explained  the  delay  for  the  said  period  of  4 months,  the  revision  application  cannot  be  considered  as  having  been  filed  without unnecessary  delay.


It  is  trite  law  that  when  the  revisionary   jurisdiction  of  this  court  is  invoked  the  petitioner  has  to  set  out  exceptional  circumstances   that  warrant  the  intervention  by  way  of  revision.  On  a  reading  of  the  petition,  affidavit  and  other  relevant  documents  attached   to  it   one  cannot  find  any  such  exceptional  circumstances  therein.   In  the  circumstances,  it  is  my  view  that  the  1st   intervenient-petitioner  is  not  entitled  to  be  heard  in  revision.  For  the  foregoing  reasons  the  application  made  by  him  is  dismissed  subject  to  cost.

                   Sgd.
Judge of the Court of Appeal
delayed application
yet another delayed application

 C.A.  No.  437/2003  
D.C. Bandarawela  No.  23/Probate.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

CIVIL PROCEDURE AMENDMENT NO 43 OF 2024

-
Image
  defult of appearance - An overview  by GalleLaw Blogger  on the amendment 43 of 2024 to section 86, 87 and 88 to the CPC  VACATION OF exparte ORDERS, JUDGMENTS AND DECREES. The Civil Procedure Code (Ordinance No. 2 of 1889) governed case procedures in the Original and Appellate Courts for nearly 85 years, from 1889 until 1974, when it was replaced by the Administration of Justice Laws No. 44 of 1973 and No. 25 of 1974. During a brief period from 1974 to 1977, the Civil Procedure Code was superseded by the AJL. However, in 1977, the Civil Procedure Code of 1889 was reinstated by the Civil Courts Procedure (Special Provisions) Law No. 19 of 1977. Section 86 of the Civil Procedure Ordinance outlined the procedures for setting aside a decree *nisi*  (a provisional judgment)  under the CPC ordinance. Under Section 86(2), if a defendant provides reasonable grounds for the default, the court was empowered to set aside the decree and resume the case from the s...
Read more

What law governs the granting or remanding of an accused or suspect person? The law that governs the granting or remanding of an accused or suspect person is the Bail Act No. 30 of 1997. This Act provides for the release on bail of persons suspected or accused of being concerned in committing or having committed an offense. It also provides for the granting of anticipatory bail and other related matters. The Bail Act establishes that the grant of bail should be the guiding principle, subject to exceptions as provided for in the Act, and refusal to grant bail should be the exception. It prevails over the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act and other written laws, except for the Release of Remand Prisoners Act, No. 8 of 1991.

-
Image
  SUMMARY BY THE BLOGGER    Background:  The accused has been indicted for the offense of grave sexual abuse of a minor, an offense is punishable under section 365B (2) (b) of the Penal Code. The accused was initially released on bail by the Court. The trial against the accused commenced on 21-07-2022. On 5th October 2023, the Court ordered the accused to be remanded pending further trial. The Lawyer for the accused filed a motion seeking bail, but it was refused.   The petitioner, acting on behalf of the accused, filed an application for revision in the Court of Appeal invoking Article 138 of The Constitution. After considering the facts, circumstances, and relevant law, the Court ordered the immediate release of the accused from remand custody on the earlier bail conditions.   1.   The Court relied on section 263 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act to remand the accused, but failed to consider the relevant provisions of the Bail Act No. 30 of ...
Read more