PRESCRIPTION-LICENSEE-LENTH OF POSSESSION IS OF NO RELEVANCE

PRESCRIPTION-LICENSEE-LENTH OF POSSESSION IS OF NO RELEVANCE

 

When someone entera land in a particular capacity,  he continues in possession in the same capacity, and his possession changes not or can be put an end to by secret intention unless nothing short of ouster or equivalent is proved. If the evidence relating to prescription is slender, the length of one’s possession is of no use to decide a prescription. relationship of the parties sometimes would be of immense importance to resolve disputes touching upon claims for the prescriptive title.

 

A synopsis of the Judgment written by the BLOGGER

In summary, the case involved a plaintiff seeking to partition a specific property (lot h) among co-owners, including the 22nd defendant who claimed ownership of the entire land based on a deed of gift. The trial judge ruled against the 22nd defendant's claim, stating there was no evidence of adverse possession or valid prescriptive title. The 22nd defendant appealed, arguing that his long-standing possession and improvements on the land supported his claim. However, it was established that the donor of the land did not have legal ownership at the time of the gift, and there was no evidence of prescriptive title before the gift was made. The deed of gift also lacked clarity regarding the donor's title. The court concluded that silent possession without ousting the true owner does not constitute adverse possession and that a licensee's long-standing possession does not grant prescriptive rights.

 

 in the court of appeal of the democratic socialist republic of sri lanka

 

A. W. A. SALAM, J.

 

The plaintiff filed an action for partition of lot h depicted in the preliminary plan no 681 the identity of which was undisputed. in terms of the plant, undivided rights from and out of the corpus were to be distributed among the plaintiff and 1st to 21st defendants. There was no contest regarding the devolution of title either. 

 

The 22nd defendant was admittedly not a co-owner of the corpus but made a party to the action, based on the purported assertion of title to the whole land on a deed of gift-bearing no 498 dated 12 October 1962 produced as 22d2.

 

The pivotal question as to whether the 22nd defendant had acquired a valid prescriptive title to the entire land was answered by the trial judge in the negative and consequently, an interlocutory decree was entered for partition of the corpus among the co-owners who were declared entitled to undivided rights. the parties who were thus declared entitled as co-owners were the plaintiff and 1st to 21st defendants. aggrieved by the interlocutory decree the 22nddefendant has preferred the present appeal.

 

The 22nd defendant relied on deed of gift no 498 dated 12 october 1962 produced as 22d2 and his long and continued possession of the subject matter in proof of his prescriptive title. by 22d2 Percy Batugedara gifted the subject matter of the partition action to the 22nd defendant who incidentally is his son-in-law.

 

In this background, the real crux of the issue was whether the 22nddefendant had acquired a valid prescriptive title to the subject matter of the action as asserted by him or whether he was a mere licensee of the plaintiff’s predecessors in title as stressed by the plaintiff and 1st to 21st defendants. it was the position of the plaintiff that the 22nd defendant was the speaker of the national state assembly at or around the time he entered into possession of the corpus and he was a close relative of the plaintiff. despite the 22nddefendant was in long and continued possession, as is accepted by the district judge there was no semblance of any adverse possession.

 

conversely, the 22nd defendant urged that the following improvements effected by him on the subject matter ought to have been considered by the learned trial judge as improvements strengthening his prescriptive claim. some of the improvements effected by him are as follows…

 

1.    construction of a retaining wall around the corpus.

2.    filling the corpus with earth.

3.    construction of a boundary wall with an iron gate.

4.    landscaping the corpus with two ponds.

5.      construction of a permanent building on the corpus consisting of an office room, two other rooms and a kitchen.

 

it is common ground that Percy Batugedara had no paper title to lot “h” when he purportedly gifted it to the 22nd defendant on 22d2. as a matter of fact, Percy Batugedara had executed the deed of gift in favour of the 22nd defendant on 12 October 1962, barely three years after the demise of don David. it is to be observed that no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the 22nd defendant to establish the prescriptive title of Percy Batugedara prior to the execution of 22d2. hence, it is quite appetent that Percy Batugedara could not have prescribed to the corpus as at the date of 22d2, although the 22nd defendant had incorrectly stated in his evidence that Percy Batugedara had prescribed to the subject matter against don David. 

 

As far as the deed of gift (22d2) is concerned, a glaring infirmity appears to be the imprecise nature of the deed which lacks in clarity. in that deed the donor has deliberately omitted to recite his title and/or suppressed the mode of acquisition of title. if Percy Batugedara had acquired ownership to the subject matter by reason of his long and prescriptive possession, admittedly there was nothing that prevented him from reciting the title as such.

 

Percy Batugedara was no stranger to transactions relating to alienation of immovable properties. the 22nd defendant as at the date of execution of 22d2 was a lawyer. both of them were aware of the death of don David three years prior to the execution of 22d2. in this background, it remains a complete mystery as to what made the donor to choose not to make any reference to the prescriptive possession as the mode of acquisition of his title or for the failure of the done to insist on the disclosure of the donor’s title. it is trite law that silent possession without any act of ouster cannot be construed as adverse possession. in the case of a licensee mere possession however much exclusive or long-continued it may be, if silent, no prescriptive benefit would accrue to him.

 

As has been submitted by the learned president’s counsel several important principles touching upon the law of prescription have been succinctly laid down in the celebrated judgment in Corea vs Iseris Appuhamy 15 NLR 65. it is thus laid down where a person enters into possession of land in one capacity, he is presumed to continue in possession in that same capacity. the head note of that judgment which applies to licensees with necessary changes reads as follows….

“a co-owner's possession is in law the possession of his co-owners. it is not possible for him to put an end to that possession by any secret intention in his mind. nothing short of ouster or something equivalent to ouster could bring about that result”.

 

An the case of Tillakaratne vs Bastian 21 NEW LAW REPORT 12 it was held interalia that where possession of immovable property originally is not adverse, and in the event of a claim that it had later become adverse, the onus is on him who asserts adverse possession to prove it. then proof should be offered not only of an intention on his part to possess adversely, but a manifestation of that intention to the true owner against whom he sets up his possession.

 

Quite remarkably, overwhelming evidence had been led in the original court pointing to the 22nd defendant’s possession as being one of leave and licence under don David which was  later continued with the permission of the administrator of his estate. the evidence relating to the leave and licence granted to them has been accepted by the learned district judge after careful scrutiny. when the legal principle set out above is applied to the proved facts in this case, i do not think it can be gainsaid that the possession of Percy Batugedara and his son-in law is essentially referable to the lawful right to possess the subject matter granted by the owner of the subject matter and his agent. by reason of their having commenced possession of the land in question in this manner, it is incumbent to presume that they continued to possess the property in the same capacity. as has been submitted by the learned president’s counsel, the possession of the 22nd defendant and his father-in-law should necessarily be presumed to have continued as licensees or permissive users until they distinctly prove that their title changed.

 

As the 22nd defendant had entered the property as a licensee, the onus of proving that his possession has become adverse is fairly and squarely on him and he is expected to establish this by adducing cogent evidence of ouster. upon a careful analysis of the evidence led at the trial including that of the 22nd defendant, i find it difficult to endorse the view of the 22nd defendant that the learned trial judge had erred in coming to the conclusion that the 22nd defendant had not established his prescriptive claim.  

 

Basically, the plaintiff's case was that the two original owners of the corpus had transferred their rights by p2 to don David in the year 1950. don David and Percy Batugedara were first cousins and the latter had purchased lot "i" which is the land immediately adjacent to the corpus on the western boundary almost at the same time when don David purchased rights in the corpus.

 

The main witness who testified on behalf of the plaintiff at the trial was one don Neville Wijesinghe. the relationship of witness Wijesinghe is worthy of attention. he is the nephew of don David and to be more precise the son of charlotte Helena Wijesinghe who is a sister of don David. one of the subscribing witnesses to p2 was Percy Batugedara who had been asked to look after the property and pay taxes.

 

Don David had passed away in 1959 and the administrator of his estate was Neville Wijesinghe. no claim has been made by Percy Batugedara to the corpus during the pendency of the testamentary case in which the estate of don David had been administered. the learned trial judge has considered the failure on the part of the 22nddefendant and Percy Batugedara make such a claim as unfavourable to the prescriptive claim the former sought to set up in this case.

 

The 22nd defendant contended that to obtain title by prescription the possession of the 22nd defendant must be taken as possession of the owner and not as possession under the owner, such as tenant or licensee or some other subordinate capacity. he claims that the 22nd defendant commenced his possession with deed of gift no 498 dated 22nd of October 1962 in his favour and that he entered into possession as the owner. as his deed is duly registered, the learned counsel has urged that such registration is notice to the whole world as to his ownership.

 

In Corea v. Iseris (1911) 15 New Law Report 65], the privy council stated the law with regard to prescription among co-owners in the following terms and the statement of law is equally applicable to a licensee as well. the relevant passage from the judgment reads as follows...

 

“His possession was in law the possession of his co-owners. it was not possible for him to put an end to that possession by any secret intention in his mind. nothing short of ouster or something equivalent to ouster could bring about that result."

 

Even though 22d2 had been registered at the land registry it cannot be taken as the donor or donee having made their intention known to the owner. the authorities clearly state that deeds executed secretively and unknown to the owner cannot be considered as a starting point in prescription.

 

As regards the first argument that the 22nd defendant had entered the subject matter as the owner, it must be emphasized that he has entered the land as the successor in title of Percy Batugedara. as such he cannot have or expected to have a better title than what his predecessor held. Percy Batugedara was the first cousin of David. the relationship between both of them was so close that both of them have purchased the two adjacent lots at one and the same time. further, Batugedara has been requested to take the produce, look after the land and pay the taxes. the learned district judge has accepted this evidence as being quite probable. the evidence of Neville Wijesinghe had sounded very convincing to the learned district judge. having perused evidence of Neville Wijesinghe, i am not inclined to take a different view with regard to the credibility attached to the evidence of Wijesinghe, for the reason that the learned district judge has heard the witness testifying from the witness box and observed his demeanour while giving evidence. 

 

 

If Percy Batugedara was a mere licensee his deed in favour of the 22nd defendant could only place the latter in the same capacity as Batugedara was in relation to the land. the mere registration of the deed in the proper folio cannot be taken as evidence to strengthen his alleged prescriptive possession.

 

The learned trial judge has accepted the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff that Percy Batugedara sought permission of Neville Wijesinghe, the plaintiff’s brother, in the presence of the 22nddefendant, to put up a temporary garage on the subject matter of the action. in my view the appellant has not been able to impress upon this court that the finding of the learned district judge on that account is incorrect and/or had ended up in a miscarriage of justice.

 

In deciding the issue relating to the leave and licence granted to the 22nd defendant, the learned district judge has taken into account the position held by the 22nd defendant, as the speaker of the national state assembly and the fact that he was not only close but an influential and trusted relative of the plaintiff. this approach of the learned district judge cannot be faulted when she finally decided the issue relating to prescription.

 

The 22nd defendant had sought the permission of Neville Wijesinghe to dump debris from a building that stood on the adjacent lot “i”. the 22nd defendant had also sought permission to build a boundary wall along the land in suite for purpose of his own security at a time when his personal security was an issue. according to the evidence as accepted by the learned district judge, Neville Wijesinghe had no reason to doubt the bonfires 22nddefendant when he sought permission to build the parapet wall around the corpus, as he was the speaker of the national state assembly at the time. as regards the several occasions on which permission of neville Wijesinghe had been sought by the 22nddefendant and/or Batugedara and the consequences have been sufficiently dealt by the learned district judge. 

 

Undoubtedly the evidence to establish prescription was slender, despite the length of possession. the facts that Batugedara was a close relative of don David and that he was a signatory to p2, render it rather improbable to make his possession adverse in the strict sense of the law, particularly while proceedings to administer the estate of don David were yet pending. although the 22nddefendant has had possession of the corpus for an uninterrupted period of more than 10 years, such possession when examined in the light of the circumstances peculiar to this case, cannot be considered as adverse possession. Moreover, the learned trial judge does not appear to have in any way misdirected herself, or applied the wrong standard or test in order to decide whether the ingredients to constitute adverse possession had been proved. in the absence of any error in law, which in my opinion, the 22nddefendant has failed to demonstrate, the trial judge’s finding on the disputed issue in no way disturbing or shocks the sense of right and wrong.

 

 For the foregoing reasons, i am of the opinion that the 22nddefendant is unable succeed on the issue of prescriptive title and hence his appeal merits no favourable consideration. as such, i am compelled to affirm the interlocutory decree entered in the district court and accordingly dismiss the appeal. the appellant is entitled to recover the costs of this appeal from the substituted 22nd defendant-appellant.

 

 

judge of the court of appeal

 

                 End of the Judgment

 

 

 

C.A. Appeal No.1175/99(f)

D.C. Mt. Lavinia Case No. 2197/P

 

1.         Hettitantrige Dona Pathmawathie Mallika Abeygunawardena,

            No.178/1, Hill Street, Dehiwala.

2.         Hettitantrige Dona Sumanawathie

            Dharmatilleke,

            No.40/3, Attidiya Road, Ratmalana

3.         Hettitantrige Dona Suwineetha Mayurawathie Kapugeekiyana

            No.96, Bangalawatte, Pannipitiya

4.         Hettitantrige Don  Jayantha Sri Ananda Perera,

5.         Sujatha Perera

6.         Hettitantrige Don   Sumedha Perera

7.         Hettitantrige Dona Hashanthi Perera

8.         Hettitantrige Dona Krishanthi Perera

            All Of No. 40/3, Attidiya Road, Ratmalana

9.         Ruby Rosalin Perera

10.       Hettitantrige Kapila Haritha Perera

11.       Hettitantrige Dona Uditha Manjalie Perera.

12.       Hettitantrige Dona Deepthi Nandika Perera.

13.       Hettitantrige Don Ajith Nandana Perera.

14.       Hettitantrige Dona  Uroma Bandumathie  Perera.

            All Of  No.130, Hill Street, Dehiwala

15.       Haputantrige Don  Ananda Mangala Meewanaplana

            No.21, Huludagoda Road, Mount Lavinia

16.       Haputantrige Dona  Indrani Chinta Devendra  Meewanapalana

            No.21, Huludagoda Road, Mount Lavinia

17.       Haputantrige Don  Ashoka Chandrawansa Meewanapalana

            No.21, Huludagoda Road, Mount Lavinia

18.       Haputantrige Dona  Manel Ranjanie Wijesiriwardena.

            No.21, Huludagoda Road, Mount Lavinia

19.       Haputantrige Dona  Shivanthimala Meewanapalana.

            No.21, Huludagoda Road, Mount Lavinia

20.       Don Neville Wijesinghe

            No.178, Udupila, Delgoda

21.       Don Bernard    Wijesinghe (Deceased)

            No.587/1d,  Thambigewatte, Madiwela Road, Thalawatugoda

21a.    Lalith Candrasiri Wijesinghe

            No. 567/1d Thambigewatte, Madiwela Road, Thalawatugoda

22.       Wanniarachchige Don Stanley Tiliekeratne

            ‘Sri Nagar’ , Mirihana, Nugegoda.

                                                Defendants

                        And

            Kandanarachchige Chandra Malani Gunaratne Batugedara,

            Jubilimawatha, Mirihana, Nugegoda.

            Substituted 22nd Defendant-Appellant

 

                        Vs.

                                                Don Lincoln Lionel Wijesinghe (Deceased)

No.179, Hill Street, Dehiwala.

                        Plaintiff-Respondent

 

1.         Hettitantrige Dona Pathmawathie Mallika Abeygunawardena,

            No.178/1, Hill Street, Dehiwala.

2.         Hettitantrige Dona Sumanawathie

            Dharmatilleke,

            No.40/3, Attidiya Road, Dehiwala

3.         Hettitantrige Dona Suwineetha Mayurawathie Kapugeekiyana

            No.96, Bangalawatte, Pannipitiya

4.         Hettitantrige Don  Jayantha Sri Ananda Perera,

5.         Sujatha Perera

6.         Hettitantrige Don   Sumedha Perera

7.         Hettitantrige Dona Hashanthi Perera

8.         Hettitantrige Dona Krishanthi Perera

            All Of No. 40/3, Attidiya Road, Ratmalana

9.         Ruby Rosalin Perera

10.       Hettitantrige Kapila Haritha Perera

11.       Hettitantrige Dona Uditha Manjalie Perera.

12.       Hettitantrige Dona Deepthi Nandika Perera.

13.       Hettitantrige Don Ajith Nandana Perera.

14.       Hettitantrige Dona  Uroma Bandumathie  Perera.

            All Of  No.130, Hill Street, Dehiwala

15.       Haputantrige Don  Ananda Mangala Meewanapalana

            No.21, Huludagoda Road, Mount Lavinia

16.       Haputantrige Dona  Indrani Chinta Devendra  Meewanapalana

            No.21, Huludagoda Road, Mount Lavinia

17.       Haputantrige Don  Ashoka Chandrawansa Meewanapalana

            No.21, Huludagoda Road, Mount Lavinia

18.       Haputantrige Dona  Manel Ranjanie Wijesiriwardena.

            No.21, Huludagoda Road, Mount Lavinia

19.       Haputantrige Dona  Shivanthimala Meewanapalana.

            No.21, Huludagoda Road, Mount Lavinia

20.       Don Neville Wijesinghe

            No.178, Udupila, Delgoda

21a.    Lalith Candrasiri Wijesinghe

            No. 567/1d Thambigewatte, Madiwela Road, Thalawatugoda

                                    Defendant-Respondents

 

 

 

 

Before                    A. W. A. Salam,  J.

 

Counsel                  Dr. Sunil Cooray For The  Substituted 22nd

Defendant-Appellant Gamini Marapana P.C. With Navin Marapana  For The  Plaintiff-Respondent

Argued On            29.11.2010, 21.02.2011, And 01.04.2011

 

Decided On           :           22.08.2011

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 







 

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