REI VINDICATIO

 

Sri Lanka Law Reports 2013 - Volume 1 , Page No - 18  LUCKMANJEE VS. DIAS

 COURT OF APPEAL

ABDUS SALAM. J.

CA 606/99[F]

DC COLOMBO 17396/L

MARCH 26, 2012

Rei Vindication action - Subject matter vested in Commissioner of National Housing? - Proof of same - Admission of ownership - Relevancy- Burden of proof? - Misdirection?

The plaintiff -appellant sought a declaration of title to the corpus and ejectment of the defendants there from. The defendant whilst denying the matters urged, pleaded that the subject matter was vested in the Commissioner of National Housing [CNH] in terms of a Gazette Notification and that the CNH has transferred the land in his favour. The trial Court held with the defendant, holding that the plaintiff had not established his title.

 

Held:

(1) The trial Judge has failed to take into consideration the 4th admission recorded which invariably should have led to the conclusion that the plaintiff was the owner of the premises in suit prior to 13.1.1974.

The trial Judge has totally disregarded the admission of ownership of the plaintiff.

(2) The defendant has failed to prove the documents on which he relied to establish that the property in question has vested in the Commissioner.

(3) In the teeth of the admission of ownership the plaintiff is entitled to obtain a declaration that she sought.

 

Per Abdus Salam. J

"It appears to me that the learned District Judge has misdirected him­self with regard to the burden of proof and such misdirection has ended up in a travesty of justice - since the misapplication of the law has culminated in such a miscarriage, I consider it a paramount duty arising from the appellate jurisdiction of this Court to set aside the impugned judgment..."

APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of Colombo.

Case referred to :-

Siyaneris vs. Jayasinghe 52 NLR 289

Romesh de Silva PC with Geethaka Gunawartlane for plaintiff-appellant.

D.M.G. Dissanayake for defendant-respondent.

September 11,2013

ABDUS SALAM, J.

The plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the "plaintiff") filed action against the defendant-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the "defendant") seeking inter alia a declaration of title to the property more fully described in schedule 2 to the plaint, ejectment of the defendant therefrom and damages as prayed for in prayer 'c' to the plaint. The defendant in his answer denied the averments in the plaint and pleaded that the subject matter of the action had vested ·in the Commissioner of National Housing by operation of the Ceiling on Housing Law No 1 of 1973, in terms of the Gazette notification referred to in the answer. He further averred that the Commissioner of National Housing by deed No 16540dated 14 0ctober 1995 transferred the land and premises in question in his favour. Nevertheless, the defendant did not seek a declaration of title in the answer. At the commencement of the trial the following admissions were recorded, to wit that. . .

 

1. the defendant is in possession of the subject matter of the action more fully described and set out in schedule 2 to the plaint.

2. the defendant claims title to the said premises described in schedule 2 to the plaint.

3. the court is vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute.

4. the plaintiff was the owner of the subject matter of the action prior to 13 January 1974.

The plaintiff gave evidence and closed her case producing two documents marked as Pl and P2. The defendant also testified in presenting his case and marked three documents as Dl, D2 and D3 subject to proof. When the case of the defendant was closed the learned President's Counsel for the plaintiff insisted on the proof of D1 to D3 which had been allowed to be produced subject to proof. Yet, the defendant took no steps to prove them. By judgment dated 23 July 1999 the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the plaintiff's action. This appeal has been sought by the plaintiff.

Noticeably, the dismissal of the action was on the premise that the plaintiff had failed to establish her title. One of the arguments advanced on behalf of the plaintiff was that by reason of the admission relating to the ownership of the premises in suit prior to 13 January 1974, had not been properly considered by the trial Judge. The learned President's Counsel urged with much emphasis that had the trial Judge properly adverted to the admission of ownership of the plaintiff, he ought to have decided the case in favour of the plaintiff. Consequently, he submitted that the trial Judge has erred in dismissing the plaintiff's action.

Further the learned Presidents Counsel strenuously argued that the learned Additional District Judge has misinterpreted and misapplied the ratio in the judgment of Siyaneris vs. Jayasinghe (l) to the facts and circumstances of the present case. He further urged that the Additional District Judge had erred in holding that the property in question had vested with the Commissioner of National Housing for reasons inter alia that a property according to law normally vests in the Commissioner of National Housing by operation of the Ceiling on Housing Property Law and not by a notification appearing in the Gazette.

The Commissioner of National Housing was not called as a witness to prove the documents marked in evidence by the defendant and the plaintiff's evidence as to the fact that the property in question had not vested was not contradicted by evidence to the contrary.

At this stage, it is quite appropriate to refer to the unqualified admission made by the parties, prior to the commencement of the argument of this appeal. As it appears from the minute dated 28.11.2012, it is admitted by the parties that the Court of Appeal has by its judgment dated 15 October 2004 quashed the determination made by the Commissioner of National Housing vesting the property in question.

In the case of Siyaneris vs. Jayasinghe (supra) it was held that in a declaration of title to a property where the legal right is in the plaintiff but the property is in the possession of the defendant, the burden of proof is on the defendant. On a close scrutiny of the reason adopted in the judgment, it appears that the learned District Judge has failed to take into consideration the 4th admission recorded between the parties which invariably should have led to the conclusion that the plaintiff was the owner of the premises in suit prior to 13.1.1974.

In the impugned judgment at page 5 the learned District Judge has totally disregarded the admission of ownership of the plaintiff, by his erroneous finding that the defendant had never admitted the ownership of the plaintiff of the subject of the action. For purpose of ready reference the said statement made by the learned District Judge in the judgment is produced hereunder.

As a matter of law, the plaintiff need not have proved any­thing by reason of the admission. Thus the learned District Judge had erred in law when he held that the plaintiff had failed to prove her title to the premises in suit. I am in total agreement with the learned President's Counsel that the learned District Judge had failed to take into consideration the admission of ownership of the plaintiff, which admission if the District Judge had properly taken cognizance would not have resulted in his having placed the plaintiff under a duty to establish the title, despite the said admission.

 

As has been urged on behalf of the plaintiff the learned Additional District Judge had also erred in holding that the property in question had vested with the Commissioner of National Housing, as a property vests in the Commissioner of National Housing in terms of the Ceiling on Housing Property Law by operation of law and not by virtue of the notification published in the gazette.

 

Another important observation, I am bound to make at this stage is that the defendant has failed to prove the documents on which he relied namely D1, D2 and D3 by calling the National Housing Commissioner or a representative to establish that the property in question had vested with the Commissioner of National Housing. As the defendant has failed to establish this assertion, in the teeth of the admission of ownership, the plaintiff is entitled to obtain a declaration that she has sought.

 

It is to be observed that the plaintiff as the petitioner in C.A writ application No 233/94 has sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 17 October 1979 and 31 December 1979 or any other orders that might have been made under the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the premises bearing Assessment No 56 which is the subject matter of this action and in the alternative a writ of mandamus directing the Honourable Minister of Land and Land Development to direct the premises No 56 and 60, Sri Sangaraja Mawatha, under Section 30(a) of the Land Acquisition Act and to restore the petitioner to possession and a writ of certiorari to quash the certificate dated 17 February 1979 issued under the Section 49 of the National Housing Act No 37 of 1954 by the Minister of National Housing and Construction and a writ of mandamus directing the 3rd respondent namely the Minister of Housing and Construction to restore the petitioner to possession of the said premises and a writ of mandamus directing the 4th respondent the National Housing Development Authority to vacate the said premises, remove any encumbrances, and to restore the petitioner to possession of the said premises.

 

The aforesaid writ application having been taken up for argument in which the State had been represented by Mr Mohan Pieris, Senior State Counsel (as he then was) this court decided that the acquisition was not bona fide in the lawful exercise of the powers vested in the Minister. It was further held in that case that if the land was genuinely acquired for a public purpose as stated in the order and certificates, it should have been made use of by the State for the object or other public purposes during the 15 years that lapsed since the acquisition. In the circumstances, the Court of Appeal allowed the application and granted the petitioner in that case, namely the appellant in this case the reliefs prayed for in paragraph 1 of the prayer to the petition.

 

Taking into consideration the evidence of the plaintiff the documents produced by her and the admission No 4,the learned District Judge should have declared the plaintiff as the owner of the subject matter of the action on the strength of the ratio in the case of Siyaneris (supra).

 

As such, it appears to me that the learned District Judge has misdirected himself with regard to the burden of proof and such misdirection has ended up in a travesty of justice. Since, the misapplication of the law has culminated in such a miscarriage, I consider it a paramount duty, arising from the appellate jurisdiction of this court to set aside the impugned judgment and grant the plaintiff the reliefs prayed for in the amended plaint dated 11 July 1997 save and except the prayer c to the plaint.

 

Consequently, I direct that judgment be entered for the plaintiff as prayed for in paragraphs a, b and c of the prayer to the amended plaint dated 11 July 1997. Subject to the above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment set aside.

 

The plaintiff is entitled to the costs of this appeal.

 

Appeal Allowed

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