Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a decision of the High Court whether given by way of Appeal or Revision.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to hear appeals from orders of a Provincial High Court made in the exercise of its Revisionary Jurisdiction - Article 154P (3) (b), 154P (6) and 138(1) of the Constitution- Section 74(2) of the Primary Courts' Procedure Act No. 44 of 1979.
Sri Lanka Law Reports 1997 - Volume 1 , Page No - 62
SUPREME COURT.
G P S DE SILVA,C.J.,KULATUNGA,J.AND RAMANATHAN, J.
S.C. REFERENCE NO. 1/94. C.A. APPEAL NO. 18/92 (PHC). H.C.
COLOMBO NO. 22/91 (REV)
M.C. MT. LAVINIA NO. 68192.
MAY 26, 1995.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to hear appeals
from orders of a Provincial High Court made in the exercise of its Revisionary
Jurisdiction - Article 154P (3) (b), 154P (6) and 138(1) of the Constitution-
Section 74(2) of the Primary Courts' Procedure Act No. 44 of 1979.
The following questions were referred to the Supreme
Court for determination in terms of Article 125(1) of the Constitution.
1. Does the Court of Appeal have an appellate
jurisdiction in terms of Article 138(1) of the Constitution as amended by the
13th Amendment in respect of a decision of the Provincial High Court made in
the exercise of its Revisionary Jurisdiction?
2. Does a party aggrieved by a decision of the
Provincial High Court given in respect of a matter coming within Part VII of
the Primary Courts' Procedure Act, have a right of appeal to the Court of
Appeal in terms of Article 154P(6) of the Constitution as amended by the 13th
Amendment read with Section 74(2) of the Primary Courts Procedure Act?
Held:
(i) The Appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal
under Article 138(1) read with Article 154P(6) of the Constitution is not
limited to correcting errors committed by the High Court only in respect of
Orders given by way of appeal. The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear an
appeal against a decision of the High Court whether given by way of Appeal or
Revision.
(ii) Section 74(2) of the Act No. 44 of 1979 plainly
prohibits an appeal from the decision of the Primary Court Judge. Such
prohibition cannot affect the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal against a
decision of the High Court.
The questions referred to are answered as follows:
1. Yes
2. Yes
Per Kulatunga, J.,
"There is no warrant for dissecting Article
138(1) into two parts and holding that the powers of Appeal and Revision given
by the Second Part are limited to decisions given in the exercise of the
original jurisdiction of the High Court. The entire article should be read as a
whole."
Cases referred to:
1. Gunaratne v. Thambinayagam (1993) 2 Sri L.R. 355.
Reference to the Supreme Court under Article 125(1) of
the Constitution.
J. W. Subasinghe P.C. with D. R. P. Goonetilake and
Manohara de Silva for appellants.
S. Mahenthiran with Sampath Welgampola for appellant
in C.A. 1/93 (PHC).
Nihal Jayamanne with Prasantha de Silva, Ms Noorania
Amerasinghe and Ms. Vasana Perera for 1st respondent. Other respondents absent
and unrepresented.
Cur. adv. vult.
June 8, 1995.
KULATUNGA, J.
A dispute affecting land (between the Party of the 1st
Part and the Party of the 2nd Part, hereinafter referred to as the
"appellant" and the "1st respondent", respectively) was
referred to the Magistrate's Court of Mt. Lavinia under Section 66 of the
Primary Courts' Procedure Act No. 44 of 1979. After inquiry, the Magistrate (acting
in his capacity of a Primary Court Judge) made order in terms of Section 68 of
the Act directing the appellant to be restored to possession. That order was
set aside by the High Court of the Western Province acting in revision on an
application made by the 1st respondent. The appellant being aggrieved by the
judgment of the High Court, appealed to the Court of Appeal.
At the hearing of the appeal a preliminary objection
was raised that the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
as the same is in respect of an order made in the exercise of the revisionary
jurisdiction of the High Court. A question was also raised as to whether in the
light of Section 74(2) of Act No. 44 of 1979 the appellant is entitled to appeal
to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal acting under Article 125(1) of the
Constitution, referred the following questions to this Court for determination.
(1) Does the Court of Appeal have an appellate
jurisdiction in terms of Article 138(1) of the Constitution as amended by the
13th amendment in respect of a decision of the Provincial High Court made in
the exercise of its revisionary jurisdiction?
(2) Does a party aggrieved by a decision of the
Provincial High Court given in respect of a matter coming within part VII of
the Primary Courts Procedure Act, have a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal
in terms of Article 154P(6) of the Constitution as amended by the 13th
amendment read with Section 74(2) of the Primary Courts' Procedure Act.
Learned Counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that
on a proper construction of the relevant provisions, the Court of Appeal cannot
entertain the appeal; and the appellant's remedy is possibly by way of revision
to the Court of Appeal. In the alternative he submitted that the decision in Gunaratne
v Thambinayagam (1) is wrong when it held that Section 9 of Act No. 19 of 1990
does not permit direct appeals to the Supreme Court from orders made in the
exercise of revisionary jurisdiction of the High Court of a Province; and that
it is the Supreme Court which has the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from
the impugned judgment. On the second question, Counsel submitted that Section
74(2) of Act No. 44 of 1979 provides that "an appeal shall not lie against
any determination or order under this part"; that the right of appeal
under Article 154P(6) is subject to law; hence Section 74(2) should be
interpreted as prohibiting any appeal to any Court, including the Court of
Appeal. Counsel argued that this interpretation will give effect to the intention
of the Legislature which is to avoid protracted litigation in respect of orders
made by a Primary Court Judge which are of an interim nature.
Learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Mahenthiran
who was heard (in terms of Article ' 34(3) of the Constitution) in view of the
fact that he appears for the appellant in a similar case C.A. No. 1/93 (PHC)
submitted that in Gunaratne v. Thambinayagam (Supra) this Court was concerned
with the interpretation of Section 9 of Act No. 19/1990; hence that decision has
no application here. In the matter before us, there is no justification for
eroding the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under Article 138(1)
to entertain appeals lodged in the exercise of the right of appeal granted by
Article 154P(6). Counsel also submitted that Section 74(2) only precludes an
appeal from an order of the Primary Court Judge and it would not touch the
power of the Court of Appeal to entertain an appeal from the judgment of the
High Court.
In order to determine the questions referred to this
Court, we have to interpret the provisions of Article 154P (3) (b), Article 154
(P) (6) and Article 138(1) of the Constitution. These Articles are reproduced
below.
A. 154 P (3) -
"Every such High Court shall -
(a) ....................
(b)
notwithstanding anything in Article 138 and subject to any law,
exercise, appellate and revisionary jurisdiction in respect of convictions,
sentences and orders entered or imposed by Magistrate's Courts and Primary Courts
within the Province".
A. 154 P (6) -
"Subject to the provisions of the Constitution
and any law, any person aggrieved by a final order, judgment or sentence of any
such Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under paragraph (3) (b) . . . .
. ., may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeal in accordance with Article
138".
A. 138 (1) -
"The Court of Appeal shall have and exercise
subject to the provisions of the Constitution or of any law, an appellate
jurisdiction for the correction of all errors in fact or in law which shall be committed
by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or original jurisdiction or
by any Court of First Instance, Tribunal or other institution and sole and
exclusive cognizance, by way of appeal, revision and restitution in integrum,
of all causes, suits, actions, prosecutions, matters and things of which such
High Court, Court of First Instance, Tribunal or other institution may have
taken cognizance".
In Gunaratne v. Thambinayagam (Supra) the question
that came up for consideration was whether the right of direct appeal to the
Supreme Court provided by S.9 of Act No. 19 of 1990 is limited to orders made
by the High Court in the exercise of its "appellate jurisdiction" in
the narrow sense and excluded appeals from orders made in the exercise of its "revisionary
jurisdiction". It was held that S.9 would not confer a right of appeal in
respect of revisionary orders of the High Court. In so deciding, this Court had
regard inter alia, to the following considerations:
(a) The
power of revision is an extraordinary power distinct from the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court.
(b) The
right of appeal is a statutory right and must be expressly created and granted
by statute.
(c)
Section 9 refers to orders made in the exercise of the appellate
jurisdiction of the High Court. In contrast S.31DD(1) of the Industrial
Disputes Act as amended by Act No. 32 of 1990 (which also provides for direct
appeals to the Supreme Court) provides for an appeal from any final order of a
High Court, in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction or its revisionary
jurisdiction, vested in it by law, in relation to an order of a Labour
Tribunal.
It is thus clear that the expression "appellate
jurisdiction" in S.9 of Act No. 19 of 1990 has a restricted meaning. If so,
this Court cannot enlarge the right of appeal granted by that section. It is a
matter for Parliament. As such, I am unable to agree that the case of Gunarathe
v. Thambinayagam (Supra) has been wrongly decided. In the instant case, we are
not concerned with the question whether a statutory right of appeal granted by
ordinary law is subject to any limitation. The question here is whether the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under Article 138(1) of the
Constitution to entertain appeals made in terms of Article 154P(6) is
restricted and excludes the power to entertain appeals from revisionary orders
of the High Court. If it is so restricted then, it also means that the right of
appeal granted by Article 154P(6) is restricted by Article 138(1).
Conceptually, the expression "appellate
jurisdiction" includes powers in appeal and on revision. From the time of
the Administration of Justice Law No. 44 of 1973 it also includes restitution
in integrum. See Sections 36 and 37 of the Courts Ordinance (Cap.6), Sections
11 and 354 of the A.J. L. and Articles 138, 139 and 145 of the Constitution.
Prior to the 13th amendment when only the Courts of First Instance, Tribunals
and other institutions were subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeal, there was no question that the Court of Appeal was empowered to
exercise its jurisdiction "by way of appeal, revision and restitution in
integrum". Under the 13th amendment the High Court of a Province which is
vested with powers of appeal as well as revision is not a Court of First
Instance. Hence, by a consequential amendment to Article 138(1), that Court
also has been made subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeal. The amendment provides inter alia that "the Court of Appeal shall
have and exercise ... an appellate jurisdiction for the correction of all
errors ... which shall be committed by the High Court, in the exercise of its
appellate or original jurisdiction".
The power to review the orders of Magistrate's Courts
and Primary Courts by way of appeal and revision is conferred on High Courts by
Article 154P (3) (b). Section 3 of Act No. 19 of 1993 extended this power to
orders of Labour Tribunals and orders made under Sections 5 and 9 of the
Agrarian Services Act. Had these provisions conferred appellate jurisdiction on
the High Court to be exercised by way of appeal and revision, the questions of
interpretation of the kind which have arisen from time to time may not have
arisen. However, the use of the expression "appellate and revisionary
jurisdiction" has given rise to such questions. Whenever such questions
arise as to the meaning of a particular provision, the Court has to interpret
the statute and determine its meaning on the basis of the intention of
Parliament or the supposed intention of Parliament, having regard to the
language of the statute and relevant rules of interpretation. As stated in
Bindra's "Interpretation of Statutes" 7th Ed. p.945:
"It is the duty of the Court to determine in what
particular meaning or particular shade of meaning the word or expression was
used by the Constitution makers, and in discharging the duty the Court will
take into account the context in which it occurs, the subject to serve which it
was used, its collocation the general congruity with the concept or object it
was intended to articulate and a host of other considerations. Above all, the
Court will avoid repugnancy with accepted norms of justice and reason".
In the case before us, Article 154P (3) (b) conferred
"appellate and revisionary" jurisdiction on the High Court. Article
154P (6) provides that any person aggrieved by a decision of the High Court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction inter alia, under paragraph (3) (b) may appeal
therefrom to the Court of Appeal in accordance with Article 138. Thus Article
154(P) (6) itself has not limited the right of appeal given by it to orders
made by the High Court by way of appeal. However, that Article refers back to
Article 138 which spells out the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal and the
manner of its exercise.
Learned counsel for the list respondent relies upon
the wording of the first part of Article 138(1) to argue that the right of
appeal given by Article 154(p) (6) is limited to correcting errors committed by
the High Court in deciding appeals. This argument is based on the use of the
words "appellate jurisdiction for the correction of all errors ...
committed by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or original
jurisdiction". Counsel next cites the second part of Article 138(1) which
gives the Court "sole and exclusive cognizance by way of appeal, revision
and restitutio in integrum of all causes, suits actions, prosecutions, matters
and things of which such High Court, Court of First Instance, Tribunals or
other institution may have taken cognizance". He argues that by this part
the Court of Appeal is given appellate and revisionary jurisdiction only with
regard to orders made by the High Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction.
In my opinion there is no justification for the
suggested construction of Article 138(1). In using the expression
"appellate or original jurisdiction" Parliament intended to refer to
the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as opposed to its original
jurisdiction. These words were not used to limit the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeal to correct the errors committed by the High Court only in
respect of decisions given by way of appeal. This is the interpretation which
is most agreeable to justice and reason.
Secondly, there is no warrant for dissecting Article
138(1) into two parts and holding that the powers of appeal and revision given
by the second part are limited to decisions given in the exercise of the
original jurisdiction of the High Court. The entire Article should be read as a
whole. The second part is complementary to the first part and proceeds to give
the Court sole and exclusive cognizance over all the matters referred to in
that Article and to spell out the manner of exercise of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. The second part refers to "such High
Court" viz. the High Court having appellate and original jurisdiction.
Accordingly, I hold that the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear an appeal
against a decision of the High Court whether given by way of appeal or on
revision.
There is also no merit in the submission that Section
74(2) of Act No. 44 of 1979 is a bar to an appeal to the Court of Appeal from
the judgment of the High Court. That section plainly prohibits an appeal from a
decision of the Primary Court Judge. Such prohibition cannot affect the right
of appeal to the Court of Appeal against a decision of the High Court. It is
true that the right of appeal given by Article 154(P) (6) is subject to any
law. However, having regard to its plain meaning, Section 74(2) cannot be
invoked to deprive the appellant's right of appeal to the Court of Appeal. On
the other hand, in the absence of clear and express provision, it is in the
interest of justice that such right should be upheld rather than denied lest
erroneous decisions of the High Court will be immune from scrutiny by a
Superior Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the questions referred to
this court have to be answered as follows:
1. Yes.
2. Yes.
The appellant will be entitled to costs in a sum of
Rs. 750/- payable by the 1st respondent.
G. P S. DE SILVA, C. J. - I agree.
RAMANATHAN, J. - I agree.
Questions referred answered.
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