HON JANAK DE SILVA, J. Section 66
NOOR SUVEIRA VS JULIAN ROBINSON
HON JANAK DE SILVA, J.
Case No. CA (PHC) APN 79/2017
H.C.
Colombo Case No. HCRA/181/2016
M.C. Colombo Case No. 2781/06/2012
In the matter of an application for Revision under and in
terms of Article 138 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka.
01. Noor Suveira
02. A.S.M.Azwar
Both of them are
at
No.157/39, Mahawatte Road,
Colombo 14.
Respondents-Petitioners-Petitioners
Vs.
01. Julian
Pushpadevi (deceased)
02. Julian
Robinson
03. Duleeka
Nishanthi
All are at,
No.151/38, Mahawatte Road
Colombo 14.
Petitioners-Respondents-Respondents
Before
: K.K. Wickremasinghe J.
Janak De Silva J.
Counsel : Saliya
Pieris P.C. with Rasika Dissanayake and W. Wijeratne for
Respondents-PetitionersĀPetitioners
Nevil Abeyratne P.C. with A. Dayaratne for Petitioners-Respondents-Respondents
Decided on : 02.11.2018
Janak De Silva J.
This
is an application in revision made against the order of the learned High Court
Judge of the Western Province holden in Colombo dated 26.05.2017.
The
chronology of events material to this application began when the father of the
PetitionersĀ Respondents-Respondents (Respondents) Joseph Julian instituted
action bearing No. 17070/L in the District Court of Colombo against the father
of the 2nd Respondent-Petitioner-Petitioner A.S.M. Ashroff in 1995. The said
action was dismissed in 2001 and the father of the Respondents preferred an
appeal to the Civil Appellate High Court of Colombo which allowed the appeal
and directed trial de novo on 11.11.2011.
While
the action in D.C. Colombo case no. 17070/L was pending the Respondents
instituted proceedings in M.C. Colombo case no. 2781/06/2012 under the Primary
Courts Procedure Act (Act) by way of private information in relation to a right
of way. The learned Magistrate made order under section 69 of the Act declaring
the Respondents entitled to the right of way. The Petitioners filed a revision
application against the said order in the Provincial High Court of Colombo case
no. HCRA 150/2012. The learned High Court Judge dismissed the said revision
application by order dated 09.10.2015. The Petitioners preferred an appeal to
this Court against the said order which appeal is currently pending.
Thereafter,
the Respondents made an application to execute the writ in the Magistrates
Court based on the order of dismissal dated 09.10.2015 made in High Court
Colombo case no. HCRA 150/2012. The Petitioner objected to this application.
The learned Magistrate after hearing parties delivered order dated 26.09.2016
allowing the application of the Respondents to execute the writ.
Thereafter
the Petitioners preferred a revision application bearing case no. HCRA 181/2016
to the Provincial High Court of the Western Province holden in Colombo and
obtained a stay order staying the operation of the order dated 26.09.2016.
After due inquiry, the learned High Court Judge by his order dated 26.05.2017
dismissed the revision application with costs fixed at Rs. 25,000/=. The
Petitioners then preferred this revision application against the said order
dated 26.05.2017.
The
Petitioners are challenging the order dated 26.05.2017 made in HCRA 181/2016 on
two main grounds. Firstly, they submit that the learned High Court Judge of the
Western Provincial High Court holden in Colombo as well as the learned
Magistrate of the Magistrates Court of Colombo erred in law by failing to appreciate
the fact that the Magistrates Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine
action instituted under the provisions of section 66 of the Act as the District
Court action in case no. 17070/L was pending where the Respondents had sought
the same relief as sought in the proceedings instituted under section 66 of the
Act. Secondly, they submit that the learned High Court Judge of the Western
Provincial High Court holden in Colombo as well as the learned Magistrate of
the Magistrates Court of Colombo erred in law by failing to appreciate the fact
that irreparable loss and damage would be caused to the Petitioners by allowing
the Respondents to execute the writ pending the appeal.
No
automatic stay of proceedings by mere lodging of appeal
I
will first discuss the second ground raised by the Petitioners to resist the
execution of the writ. In essence the argument of the Petitioners is that the
mere lodging of an appeal in the Court of Appeal against the order dated
09.10.2015 made in the Provincial High Court of Colombo case bearing no. HCRA
150/2012 automatically stays the execution of the said order.
There
was at one time conflicting views expressed on this question. In R.A. Kusum
Kanthilatha v. lndrasiri [(2005) 1 Sri. L. R. 411) this Court held inter alia
that upon proof of an appeal being preferred to the Court of Appeal against a
judgment of the High Court acting in revision in respect of an order made under
Part VII of the Act, the original court should stay its hand until the determination
of the appeal. A different view was taken by this Court in R.P. Nandawathie and
another v. K. Mahindasena [(CA(PHC) 242/2006, C.A.M 03.11.2009) where it was
held inter alia that the mere lodging of an appeal does not ipso facto stay the
execution of the order of the High Court and that something more has to be done
by the aggrieved party and something more has to be shown, to stay the
execution of the judgment or order.
In
order to resolve the conflict arising from these two decisions, a divisional bench
of this Court was constituted in Jayantha Wickremasinghe Gunasekera alias
Kananke Dhammadinna v. Jayatissa Wickremasinghe Gunasekera and others
[CA(PHC)APN 17/2006; C.A.M. 30.09.2011) where it was held that the mere lodging
of an appeal against the judgment of the High Court in the exercise of its
revisionary power in terms of Article 154P (3)(b) of the Constitution to the
Court of Appeal does not automatically stay the execution of the order of the
High Court. The divisional bench followed the decision in R.P. Nandawathie and
another v. K. Mahindasena (supra) subject to a slight variation as to the basis
of the decision.
The
question arise which decision must be followed by this bench. In Walker Sons
and Co. (UK) Ltd. v. Gunatilake and others [(1978-79-80) 1 Sri.LR. 231 at 245)
Thamotheram J. quoted with approval the following statement of Basnayake C.J.
in Bandahamy v. Senanayake (62 N.L.R. 313):
"We
have in this country over the years developed a cursus curia of our own which
may be summarised thus:
a)
One judge sitting alone as a rule follows a decision of another sitting alone.
Where a judge sitting alone finds himself unable to follow the decision of
another sitting alone the practice is to reserve the matter for the decision of
more than one judge.
b)
A judge sitting alone regards himself as bound by the decision of two or more
judges.
c)
Two judges sitting together also as a rule follow the decision of two judges.
Where two judges sitting together find themselves unable to follow a decision
of two judges, the practice in such cases is also to reserve the case for the
decision of a fuller bench although the Courts Ordinance does not make express
provision in that behalf as in the case of a single judge.
d)
Two judges sitting together regard themselves as bound by a decision of three
or more judges.
e)
Three judges as a rule follow a unanimous decision of three judges, but if
three judges sitting together find themselves unable to follow a unanimous
decision of three judges a fuller bench would be constituted for the purpose of
deciding the question involved.
f)
Four judges when unanimous are regarded as binding on all benches consisting of
less than four. In other words, a bench numerically inferior regards itself as
bounded by the unanimous decision of a bench numerically superior.
g)
The unanimous decision of a collective Court i.e; a bench consisting of all the
judges for the time being constituting the Court is regarded as binding on a
bench not consisting of all the judges for the time being constituting the
Court even though that bench is numerically superior to the collective court
owing to the increase in the number of judges for the time being constituting
the Court." (emphasis added)
Accordingly,
I am inclined to take the view that the decision in Jayantha Wickremasinghe
Gunasekera alias Kananke Dhammadinna v. Jayatissa Wickremasinghe Gunasekera and
others (supra) is binding on this Court. Therefore, I am of the view that the
learned Magistrate was correct in allowing the application of the Respondents to
execute the writ in M.C. Colombo case no. 2781/06/2012 by his order dated
26.09.2016 and that the learned High Court Judge was correct in not interfering
with the said order by his order dated 26.05.2017.
Similar
Relief in both the District Court and Primary Court
The
Petitioner submits that the learned High Court Judge of the High Court of the
Western Province holden in Colombo as well as the learned Magistrate of the
Magistrates Court of Colombo erred in law by failing to appreciate the fact
that the Magistrates Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine action
instituted under the provisions of section 66 of the Act as the District Court
action in case no. 17070/L was pending where the Respondents had sought the
same relief as sought in the proceedings instituted under section 66 of the
Act.
The
learned High Court Judge has rejected this submission by relying on the
decision in Kanagasabai v. Mylwaganam (78 N.L.R. 280) where it was held
that the mere fact that a suit is pending in a civil court does not deprive the
Magistrate of jurisdiction to make an order under Sections 62 and 63 of the
Administration of Justice Law, No. 44 of 1973. The learned counsel for the
Petitioner submits that the facts of the said case is totally different from
the facts of this case. He submits that in Kanagasabai v. Mylwaganam (supra)
the proceedings in the Primary Court was filed prior to the institution of
civil proceedings whereas in the instant case the proceedings in the Primary
Court was filed while a civil action was pending in the District Court.
However,
I am of the view that the issue of whether the Magistrates Court has no
jurisdiction to hear and determine action instituted under the provisions of
section 66 of the Act as the District Court action in case no. 17070/L was
pending where the Respondents had sought the same relief as sought in the
proceedings instituted under section 66 of the Act does not arise for
consideration in this application. This application originated with the
Petitioner objecting to the application made by the Respondent to execute the
writ in M.C. Colombo case no. 2781/06/2012. The learned Magistrate by his order
dated 26.09.2016 allowed the application. The Petitioner then moved in revision
to the High Court which dismissed his application by order dated 26.05.2017
against which this revision application was filed by the Petitioner.
The
issue on jurisdiction was specifically raised before the learned Magistrate in
M.C. Colombo case no. 2781/06/2012 as well as before the learned High Court
Judge in HCRA 150/2012 in the revision application made against the order in
M.C. Colombo case no. 2781/06/2012. In both instances the objection was
overruled. As pointed out earlier there is an appeal pending against the judgment in the Provincial High Court
of Colombo case bearing no. HCRA 150/2012. The issue raised by the Petitioner
on proceedings in two courts is a matter that may have to be considered, if
permitted by law, in the appeal filed against the order dated 09.10.2015 made
in the Provincial High Court of Colombo bearing no. HCRA 150/2012. That issue
cannot be raised in these proceedings.
For
the reasons aforesaid, I see no basis to interfere with the order of the
learned High Court Judge of the Western Province holden in Colombo dated
26.05.2017.
That
leaves the question of costs to be decided. The learned High Court Judge in
H.C. Colombo Case No. HCRA/181/2016 awarded Rs. 25,000/= as costs to the
Respondent as he was of the view that the Petitioner had by resorting to
several actions over a period of five years negated the intention of the
legislature in providing a speedy remedy to prevent the breach of peace.
In
Leon Peris Kumarasinghe v. Samantha Weliweriya [S.C. (Spl) L.A. No. 37 /2012,
S.C.M. 12.11.2013) Tilakawardane J. stated (at page 7):
"The
Court notes that the time has come for the Supreme Court to affirmatively
determine the utility of punitive costs with the primary view of deterrence.
The decision to award punitive damages is consistent with similar decisions in
foreign jurisdictions including [but not limited to] the Indian Case of Reliance
Mobile v Hari Chand Gupta (2006) (CPJ 73 NC), where punitive damages were
awarded, for the production of a false affidavit, with the intention of
preventing such actions in the future and Polye v Papaki and Another [2001](1
LRC 170), where the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea determined that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was invoked without reasonable cause and
amounted to a misconduct on the part of the Appellant which resulted in unnecessary
expenditure by the Respondents and granted punitive damages accordingly.
This
Court cannot over emphasize the need to appropriately deal with litigants who
attempt to abuse the process of Court and thereby cause unnecessary delay and
costs to other parties in order to ensure that, in the future, litigants will
not be tempted to indulge in such ill-conceived practices."
The
decision in Jayantha Wickremasinghe Gunasekera alias Kananke Dhammadinna v.
Jayatissa Wickremasinghe Gunasekera and others (supra) was delivered on
30.09.2011 thereby clarifying an issue on which there was a divergence of
judicial view up to that point of time. However, the Petitioner has over a
period of six years from 2012 resorted to several actions in order to delay the
execution of the writ of eviction in the Magistrates Court on the basis of the
pending appeal. The Petitioners did not pursue any action to obtain any interim
relief staying the operation of the judgment in the Provincial High Court of
Colombo case no. HCRA 150/2012. Furthermore, the District Court of Colombo
delivered judgment on 27.10.2016 in D.C. Colombo case no. 17070/L by which the
Respondents were given the right of way. Yet the Petitioner maintained this
application clearly in view of having obtained a stay order staying the
execution of the writ in the Magistrates Court.
In
view of the above facts, I am of the view that Court is justified in directing
the Petitioners to pay the Respondents costs of Rs. 1,00,000/=.
Application
is dismissed with costs fixed at Rs. 1,00,000/=.
Judge of the Court of Appeal
K.K.
Wickremasinghe J.
I agree.
Judge of the Court of Appeal
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