PEIRIS AND ANOTHER v. PERERA AND ANOTHER Sri Lanka Law Reports 2002 - Volume 2 , Page No - 128

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PEIRIS AND ANOTHER v. PERERA AND ANOTHER

(The blogger's understanding of the judgment is summarized as follows)

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The defendants filed a petition seeking permission to appeal against the orders issued by the District Judge on January 19 and January 24, 2001. They also requested a stay of proceedings in DC Panadura case No. 2794/spl. Initially, the court granted a stay order on January 31, 2001, but later refused to extend it on April 6, 2001, as the dispute involved a right of way.

The situation arose from the following facts: The District Judge, through his order on January 19, 2001, issued a mandatory injunction to remove an obstruction that hindered access to the plaintiff's premises, as stated in the complaint. Additionally, on January 24, 2001, the judge issued another order to demolish a wall constructed to prevent the plaintiff from accessing her own premises.

The defendants' argument to set aside the impugned order was based on the claim that the District Judge lacked jurisdiction to issue a mandatory injunction under section 664(1) of the Civil Procedure Code or section 54(1) of the Judicature Act of 1978. They acknowledged that the ownership of the disputed land and the rights of title should be determined by the District Court after a trial.

It is important to note that courts have the power to issue mandatory injunctions in certain instances. The relevant provisions in the Judicature Act and the Civil Procedure Code allow courts to issue interim injunctions, with the operative term being "restrain." In some cases, "restrain" may require a positive action, such as removing an obstruction to a road created by a recently erected fence. Acts that nullify a restraining order must be prevented, particularly when they are of recent origin and compel a party to seek relief. Interim relief is an equitable remedy, and delay would undermine equity. Mandatory injunctions, which involve a positive action, are necessary as ancillary to injunctions aimed at protecting or preventing the subject matter from changing since the cause of action arose.

While the grant of a mandatory injunction is discretionary and not automatic, and there is no specific legislation in Sri Lanka to address situations where mandatory injunctions can be granted, courts are not prohibited from granting such relief when justice demands it...

In the present case, the court found that the District Judge was justified in issuing the challenged orders on January 19, 2001, and January 24, 2001. The court refrained from interfering with the District Judge's order, which warranted a mandatory injunction, considering the unique circumstances of the case. The Photographs presented as evidence showed a clear violation of the respondent's rights, as a gate leading to her premises was obstructed by a recently constructed cement block wall. In such instances, where the status quo has been altered, courts should intervene to rectify the situation, even if it requires granting mandatory relief.

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