The judgment delivered in Nishantha and 3 others v State (supra) has not considered section 63B(1) of the said Act, as amended in the above context. Furthermore, in the said judgment, the aforementioned amendments to the Principal Act were not considered in the context of sections 26, 28(1), 63(1), 63A and 63B of the Act and in the light of the object of enacting the Principal Act. As a result, the said interpretation defeats the object of the said amendments made to the Principal Act. Moreover, I am of the opinion that the interpretation given to the word “equipment” in the said judgment is repugnant to Article 27(14) of the Constitution. Thus, I am of the view that the said judgment is per in curium though it was cited by the appellants. Did this Provincial High Court err in law when it upheld the confiscation/forfeiture of the said lorry based on a conviction of a charge punishable under section 63(1) of the Mines and Minerals... Answer No
JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT
SC Appeal No: 101/2012
Decided on : 5th July, 2023
Priyantha Jayawardena PC, J
This is an appeal to set aside the judgment of the Provincial High Court holden in Chilaw [hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”], dismissing an appeal preferred against an Order that forfeited a lorry transporting gravel without a valid licence by the Magistrate’s Court.
The claimant-appellant-appellant [hereinafter referred to as the “appellant”] is the registered owner of the lorry bearing registration number SG GM-1178, which was forfeited to the State by the learned Magistrate.
The driver of the said lorry was arrested by the Police while transporting gravel without a valid licence and proceedings were instituted against the driver in the Magistrate’s Court of Marawila in terms of section 136(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act No. 15 of 1979, as amended [hereinafter referred to as the Code of Criminal Procedure]. Further, the said lorry, along with the gravel, was produced in the Magistrate’s Court by the Police.
Subsequently, the learned Magistrate had framed a charge against the said driver under section 182(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for transporting two cubes of gravel in a vehicle bearing registration number SG GM-1178 without a valid licence issued in that behalf by the Competent Authority, and that the said driver committed an offence by violating section 28(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act No. 33 of 1992, punishable under section 63(1) of the said Act.
The driver of the lorry had pleaded guilty to the said charge. Accordingly, he was convicted and imposed a fine of Rs. 60,000/-, which was paid by him on the same day. Further, the two cubes of gravel that were being transported were forfeited by the learned Magistrate and ordered to be released to the State Engineering Corporation.
On an application made by the appellant, who is the owner of the lorry, the said lorry was released to the appellant on a bond of Rs. 1,500,000/-, pending the inquiry in terms of section 63A(2) of the Mines and Minerals Act as amended by Act No. 66 of 2009. At the said inquiry, only the appellant had given evidence.
After the conclusion of the said inquiry, the learned
Magistrate delivered the Order holding that the appellant had failed to take
the necessary precautions to prevent the driver of the said lorry
from illegally transporting gravel without a valid licence, and therefore, the said lorry
was forfeited in terms of
section 63(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act No. 33 of 1992.
Being aggrieved by the Order of the learned Magistrate
forfeiting the said lorry, the
appellant had preferred an appeal to the High Court to set aside the said Order.
After the hearing of the said appeal, the High Court held that the appellant had no right to appeal against the Order of
the Magistrate’s Court to forfeit the
lorry used for the offence in terms of the Mines and Minerals Act, and affirmed
the Order of the learned
Magistrate dated 22nd of December, 2010.
Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant had
moved the High Court to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in terms of
section 9(a) of the High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) Act No. 19
of 1990, and leave to appeal was granted on the following questions of law:
“i. Was the charge framed in this
case legal and valid when it did not
contain the mandatory requirement prescribed by section 164(4) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure No. 15 of 1979 to mention in it the law and the section
of the law under which the said confiscation/forfeiture, being a
punishment, could be made?
ii.
Did this Provincial High Court err in law in dismissing Appeal No. HCA 11/2011 filed against
the confiscation/forfeiture of lorry No. SGGM 1178 based upon the conviction of the accused- respondent-respondent of such an
illegal and invalid charge?
iii. Did this Provincial High Court
err in law when it upheld the confiscation/forfeiture of the said lorry based on a conviction of a
charge punishable under section 63(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act No. 33 of 1992 neither
which nor any amending act thereof
had provided for the
confiscation/forfeiture of a vehicle?
iv. Did
the Provincial High Court err in law when it
refused Appeal No. HCA 11/2011 filed
by the petitioner based on a preliminary objection raised by the learned
State Counsel of the said High Court
which was not tenable in law?”
When the instant appeal was taken up for hearing, the
parties to the appeal submitted that, even though the learned High Court Judge
dismissed the appeal on the premise that the appellant had
no
right to appeal against an Order made under
section 63B(1) of the Mines and Minerals
Act No. 34 of 1992, as amended
by Act No. 66 of 2009 [hereinafter referred
to as the “Mines and Minerals
Act”] section 63B(3) of the said Act provides
for an appeal against an order made for
forfeiture. Hence, both counsel appearing for the appellant and the respondent
submitted that they will confine themselves only to the third question of law set
out above.
Submissions
of the appellant
The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
section 63B(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act,
as amended, confers
power on the Magistrate to forfeit
any mineral, machinery, equipment
or material used in or in connection with the commission of an
offence under the said Act.
However, the aforesaid section does not specifically refer to
vehicles and therefore, the said section
does not confer power on the Magistrate’s Court to forfeit vehicles. Further, similar Acts such as section 40(1) of the Forest
Conservation Ordinance, section 3A of the Animals Act, and section 79 of the
Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Act expressly
provide for the “vehicle” used in the
commission of an offence to be forfeited to the State.
Furthermore, the learned counsel contended that if the words in an Act are clear,
the court does not need to interpret the words and cited the Court of Appeal judgment
delivered by Justice
Salam in Nishantha and 3 others v State [2014]
1 SLR 105 in support of said contention.
Moreover, the learned counsel cited the case of P.S. Priyantha Rajapakshe v Hon. Attorney
General (CA/PHC No. 72/2012) CA Minutes 27th of October, 2012, where
the Court of Appeal had released the
vehicle to the registered owner following
the aforementioned judgment (Nishantha
and 3 others v State [2014] 1 SLR 105).
In the circumstances, the learned counsel for the
appellants stated that the Order of the learned Magistrate and the learned
High Court Judge
erred in law and therefore, the said judgments should be
set aside.
Submissions of
the respondent
The learned Deputy Solicitor General for the respondent
submitted that the purpose of the Mines and
Minerals Act is to regulate, inter alia, the transportation of minerals. In this regard,
the learned Deputy Solicitor
General drew the attention of the court to the long title of the Mines and Minerals Act and submitted that if the
intention of the legislature was to regulate the transportation of minerals, it is necessary for the forfeiture of the vehicle
being used to illegally transport
the gravel to achieve the
intention of the said Act.
Further, it was contended that if the submissions of the appellant that the language of section 63B(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act as amended, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction is accepted, that would lead to absurdity. Thus, the said section cannot be interpreted to mean that only mineral, machinery, equipment or material used in or in connection with the commission of the offence or the proceeds of the sale of any such mineral or material deposited in court under the proviso to section 63A can be forfeited to the State, as the offence of transportation of gravel cannot be committed without the use of a vehicle. Therefore, the said Act requires the forfeiture of vehicles involved in the commission of an offence under section 63(1) of the Act.
Hence, it is necessary to adhere to the ordinary
meaning of the words used in the statute
and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention
of the legislature. However, if the language of the statute leads to
any manifest absurdity, the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such absurdity.
I shall now consider the following question of law where leave to appeal was granted by the High Court.
Did the Provincial High Court err in law when it upheld the
forfeiture of the lorry under consideration based on a conviction of a charge
punishable under section 63(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act No. 33 of 1992?
The issue that needs to be considered in the instant
appeal is whether the lorry used to transport gravel could be forfeited to the
State after an inquiry held under section 63B(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act
No. 33 of 1992, as amended by Act No. 66 of 2009.
In order to consider the above, the provisions of the Mines and Minerals Act and the purpose of enacting the Act would be considered first. Thereafter, the effects of the Mines and Minerals Act (Amendment) No. 66 of 2009 will be considered.
Mines and Minerals Act No. 33
of 1992
The long title of the said Act states as follows;
“An Act to provide for the establishment of the geological survey and mines bureau
to regulate the exploration for, mining, transportation,
processing, trading in or export of, minerals
for the transfer to such bureau of the functions of the department
of geological survey for the repeal of the
salt ordinance (chapter 211) the radioactive
minerals act, No. 46 of 1968, and the mines and minerals
law, No. 4 of
1973; and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”
[emphasis added]
Upon a careful consideration of the long title of the Mines and Minerals Act, it is evident that the Mines and Minerals Act No. 33 of 1992 repealed the Salt Ordinance (chapter 211), Radioactive
Minerals Act, No. 46 of 1968, and the Mines and Minerals
Law, No. 4 of 1973 and established the Geological Survey and Mines Bureau to regulate the
exploration for, mining, transportation,
processing, trading in or export of,
minerals and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto
with the view to having a more efficient and effective framework to regulate the exploration of mining in the country.
Thus, repealing the previous legislation and enacting
the new Act, which consolidated the important provisions contained in the repealed legislation and
introducing new provisions, shows the intention of Parliament and the importance placed by the legislature in revising
the laws at that time.
However, the Principal Act
did not provide sufficient stringent provisions to
regulate the exploration for mining, transportation, processing, trading in or export of minerals. Particularly,
there were no provisions to detect
and forfeit to the State the machinery, equipment, material or vehicles
used in or in connection with the commission of an offence
under the Mines
and Minerals Act. Moreover,
the punishments stipulated in the
Principal Act were not sufficient
deterrents to prevent violations under the said Act from occurring again.
Mines and Minerals (Amendment)
Act No. 66 of 2009
Therefore, as the State could not achieve the intention of the Parliament in enacting the Principal Act due to lack of sufficient provisions in it, the legislature amended sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 20A, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 37, 42, 46, 46A, 47, 48, 49, 51, 55, 57, 58, 61, 63, 64, 68, and 70 of the Principal Act by enacting the Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act No. 66 of 2009.
Thus, a careful consideration of the said amendments to
the Principal Act fortifies the said
observation made with regard to the intention of the legislature in enacting
the Principal Act. Thus,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting and amending the Principal Act
is a necessary factor that should be taken into consideration in interpreting the provisions of the said Act.
In this regard, N S Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Edition at page 492
to 493 states;
“Turner LJ observed in the case of Hawkins v Gathercole (1855) 6 DM & G1, ‘Regard must be had to
the intent and meaning of the legislature’. The rule upon this subject is well
expressed in the case of Stradling v
Morgan 75 ER 308.”
Further, Lord Blackburn cited the said judgment with approval
in Charles
Bradlaugh v Henry Lewis Clark Appeal [1893] 8 AC 354 at 373, which held as follows:
“…. where a statute was passed for the purpose of repealing and in part re-enacting former statutes in pari materia are to be considered in order to see what it was that the legislature intended to enact in lieu of the repealed enactments. It may appear from the language used that the legislature intended to enact something quite different from the previous law, and where that is the case effect must be given to the intention.”
Ownership and Discovery of Minerals
Section 26 of the Mines and Minerals Act, as amended,
states that the ownership of minerals is vested with the State notwithstanding
any right of ownership that any person may have to the soil where the minerals
are found or situated.
Mining to be under the authority
of a licence
Section 28(1) of the said Act states:
“No person shall explore for, mine, transport,
process, store, trade in or export any mineral except under the authority of, or otherwise
than in accordance with, a licence issued in that behalf under
the provisions of this Act and the
regulations made thereunder:
Provided ……” [emphasis added]
Thus, section 28(1) of the said Act imposes restrictions, inter alia, on the transportation of minerals without a valid license.
Offences
Section 63(1)
of the said Act states:
“(1) Any
person who-
(a)
Explores
for, or mines, processes, stores, transports,
trades in or exports, any mineral without
a licence in that behalf issued under this Act;
(b) …………………….
(c) …………………….
(d) being the holder of a licence
issued under this Act, fails to notify the Bureau of the discovery of any
mineral discovered by him in the carrying out of
the activities authorized by the licence, shall be guilty of an offence under
this Act and shall on conviction after summary trial before a Magistrate be
liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand rupees and in the case of a second or subsequent offence,
to a fine not exceeding
one million rupees or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year or to both such fine and
imprisonment.” [emphasis added]
Thus, in terms of section 63(1)(a) of the Mines and Minerals Act as amended, any person who explores or mines minerals, processes, stores, transports, trades in or exports any minerals without a valid license in that behalf issued under the Act commits an offence under the Act. It is important to note that exploration or mining, storing, transporting, trading or exporting of any minerals are separate and distinct offences under the said section.
Further, as stated above, the Principal Act was amended by inserting sections 63A
and 63B along with several other
sections to achieve
the object of the Principal Act by conferring power on Police Officers to seize and then forfeit to
the State, any machinery, equipment or materials used in or in connection
with the commission of an offence when an offence has been committed under this
Act.
Power to seize any mineral,
machinery, equipment or material
Section 63A of the Mines and Minerals Act states as follows:
“(1)
A police officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed under this Act may,
with or without a warrant, seize any mined mineral quantity of mineral
which has been mined, or any machinery, equipment
or material used in or in connection with, the commission of that offence.
(2)
Where any mineral, machinery, equipment or material is seized by a
police officer in pursuance of the
powers conferred on him by this section, he shall forthwith produce such
mineral, machinery, equipment or
material before, or make it available for inspection by, a Magistrate, who shall make such order as he thinks fit
relating to the detention or custody of such mineral, machinery, equipment or material, pending the conclusion of a prosecution instituted in respect of
such mineral, machinery, equipment or material.
Provided however,
that where any minerals, machinery, equipment or
material so seized is subject to speedy decay, the Magistrate may order
that such minerals, machinery, equipment
or material be sold and the proceeds of such sale be deposited in Court.” [emphasis added]
Thus, section 63A confers power on Police Officers to seize any machinery, equipment, or
materials used in or in connection with the commission of an offence under
the said Act and produce them in the Magistrate’s Court.
Power to forfeit to the State
Section 63B of
the said Act reads as follows:
“(1)
Where any person is convicted of an offence under this Act, the Magistrate
may make order that any mineral, machinery, equipment
or material used in, or
in connection with, the commission of that offence or the proceeds of the sale of any such minerals, or material deposited in court under the proviso
to section 63A, be forfeited to the
State.”
(2)
Any mineral, machinery, equipment or material forfeited by an order under
subsection (1), shall vest absolutely in the State upon the making of such
order.
(3)
……
(4)
The Court shall cause any mineral, machinery, equipment or material which has been vested in the State under
subsection (2) to be sold and the proceeds of such sale to be deposited in Court.” [emphasis added]
Thus, section 63B(1)
of the Act confers power on the learned Magistrate to forfeit to the State any minerals, machinery, equipment or
material produced in court
under section 63A of the said Act
where any person is convicted
of an offence under the Act.
However, the Mines and Minerals Act does not provide for an interpretation of the words “minerals, machinery, equipment, or material” referred to in the Act.
Does the Magistrate’s Court have jurisdiction to forfeit to the
State a vehicle under section 63B(1) of the Act?
Thus, it is necessary to consider whether a vehicle
(lorry, tractor, tipper, boat, ship, etc.)
that is used to transport minerals
contravening the provisions of the Act
could be forfeited to the State
by a Magistrate after a
conviction for committing an offence under the Act, when section 63B(1) of the
Mines and Minerals Act has not
specifically referred to the forfeiture of ‘vehicles’.
A cursory glance at sections 63A and 63B shows that a ‘vehicle’ is not specifically included in the said sections. Thus, it is necessary to consider whether the words “any”, “machinery” and/or “equipment” “used or in connection with the commission of an offence” in the said section comes within the scope of sections 63A and 63B, notwithstanding the fact that a ‘vehicle’ is not specifically referred to in the said sections.
In interpreting a provision of law, it is necessary
not only to look at the words of the section on the face of the provision but also to consider the
real meaning of it. Further, the legal meaning shall prevail over a mere literal
meaning on the face of a word or a phrase in an Act. Particularly, the real meaning of a
word should be considered when the
meaning on the face of a word does not lead to achieving the object of the Act or leads to absurdity over the real intended meaning by enacting the
legislation.
Further, if the plain meaning of the words
used in an Act would lead to absurdity
or be contrary to the very purpose for which the legislation has been enacted,
the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and taken into consideration not only in considering a particular section
but also the entire Act and its amendments.
Furthermore, an interpretation of an Act shall not
curtail the effect of the intended purpose of the Act or restrict the results that it would otherwise
achieve. Hence, it is necessary to adopt a construction that would not
result in futility, lead to difficulties in implementing an Act or cause hardships
to the public at large.
In the circumstances, a question will arise as to
whether a “machinery” or “equipment” can be used to transport the minerals. In
this regard, it is necessary to give a purposive interpretation to the words “machinery” or ‘equipment” in order to achieve a logical and rational meaning.
Moreover, giving an interpretation confined to these words will make the said
part of the section futile.
Hence, taking into consideration the rapid development in the technology of the equipment and machinery
used in the mining industry, the aforementioned words should be given an interpretation that would be applicable to include the modern
equipment and machinery used at present.
Therefore, the dictionary meaning of the word equipment will be considered to ascertain the real meaning and the intended
purpose of using the word “equipment” referred in the said Act.
Dictionary meaning “equipment”
Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd
edition) defines the word ‘equipment’ as:
“Tools, be they devices, machines/vehicles.
Assist a person in achieving an action beyond the normal
capabilities of a human. Tangible
property that is not land/buildings,
but facilitates business operation. [emphasis added]
Further, Stroud’s
Judicial Dictionary (6th edition) defines the word “equipment”
as:
“Equipment for the purposes of s.1(1)(a) of the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 (c.37) was held to be wide enough to include a ship of whatever size, notwithstanding that ships are not specifically mentioned in the definition of “equipment” in subsection (3), whereas vehicles and aircrafts are (Coltman v Bibbly Tankers [1987] 3 (3) W.L.R. 1181).”
[emphasis added]
Furthermore, in Coltman v Bibbly Tankers (supra), it was held that the term “ship” should be included in the term
“equipment” to achieve the intention of Parliament by making employers liable
for the injury or death of employees.
Longman Dictionary defines “equipment” as:
[emphasis added]
Thus, the dictionary meaning of the word ‘equipment’ shows that the word “equipment” includes a vehicle used in or in connection with the commission of that offence under Mines and Minerals Act No. 33 of 1992.
Applicability of Article 27(14)
of the Constitution
Article 27(14) of the Constitution states:
“The State shall respect, preserve
and improve the environment for the benefit of the community.”
Hence, Article 27(14)
requires the court to
interpret the provisions of Mines
and Minerals Act No. 33 of 1992, as amended, to
harmonise with the said Article, as
the Constitution is the Supreme Law
of the country. Further, no Act should be
interpreted contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, as mining
has a direct impact on the environment, the provisions of the Mines and Minerals Act No. 33 of 1992 should be
interpreted in harmony with
Article 27(14) of the Constitution. Further, in
this instance, such an interpretation is
necessary in order to
preserve and improve the environment for the benefit
of the community.
A similar view was observed in the case of Bulankulama
and others v Secretary, Ministry of Industrial Development and others [2000]
3 SLR 243, where it was held:
“Article 27(14) states that
“The State shall protect, preserve and improve the environment for the benefit
of the community.” Article
28(f) states that the exercise and enjoyment of rights and
freedoms (such as the 5th and 7th respondents claimed in learned counsel’s submissions
on their behalf to protection under
Article 12 of the Constitution
relating to equal protection of the
law) “is inseparable from the performance of duties and obligations, and
accordingly it is the duty of every
person in Sri Lanka to protect nature and conserve its riches.””
Consideration
of the word “any” in section 63B
Section 63B of the Mines and Minerals Act also provides for any mineral, machinery, equipment or material used in or in connection with the commission of that offence
to be forfeited to the State
by the Magistrate. Taking into consideration the intention of the legislature
and the scheme of the Act, the said amendment to the Principal Act shows that the legislature has used
the word “any”, as it is not
practical to specify all the minerals,
machinery, equipment or materials that may
be used for exploration of minerals. Thus, the word “any” referred to in the said section shows that the said word has been intentionally used to include any mineral,
machinery, equipment or
material that has been used in connection
with an offence committed under the said Act.
Applicability
of section 28
Further, section 63B(1) should be considered along with
the other provisions of the said Act. Particularly, section 28(1) of the Act
which prohibits inter alia the
transportation of minerals
without a licence. Accordingly, any person transporting
minerals without a valid licence commits an offence under the Act. Thus, such a
person is liable to be convicted under section 63(1) of the said Act.
Furthermore, as stated above, section 63B(1) has conferred
power on the learned Magistrate to forfeit to the State any mineral, machinery,
equipment or material used in or in connection with the commission of an
offence under the Act. Moreover, as the transportation of minerals without a
valid licence issued under the Act is an offence under the said Act, the
equipment used to transport minerals falls within the scope of section 63B(1).
In this regard, it is pertinent to note that any machinery, equipment or
material used not only directly for exploration of mining but also anything
that would facilitate mining and transportation are subject to the scope of the
said section.
Thus, having considered the aforesaid dictionary meaning
and the context where the word “equipment” is used in the Mines and Minerals Act, I am of the opinion that the word “equipment”
used in the Act should be taken
to include a ‘vehicle’ (lorry, tipper or even a bullock cart) used to transport
minerals without a valid license
issued under the said Act.
Therefore, I am of the view that the High Court did not
err in law when it upheld the forfeiture of the said lorry, which was transporting gravel contrary to the provisions of the said Act, based on a conviction of a charge
punishable under section
63B(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act as amended.
Further, the judgment delivered in Nishantha and 3 others v State (supra) has not considered section
63B(1) of the said Act, as amended
in the above context.
Furthermore, in the said judgment,
the aforementioned amendments to the Principal Act were not considered in the context of sections
26, 28(1), 63(1), 63A and 63B of the Act and
in the light of the object of enacting the Principal Act. As a result, the said interpretation defeats the object of the said amendments made to the
Principal Act. Moreover, I am of the opinion that the interpretation given to the word “equipment” in the said judgment is repugnant
to Article 27(14) of the Constitution. Thus, I am of the view that the said
judgment is per in curium though it was cited by the appellants.
In light of the above, the following question of law should be
answered as follows:
Did this Provincial High Court err in law when it upheld
the confiscation/forfeiture of the said lorry based on a conviction of a charge
punishable under section 63(1) of the Mines and Minerals
Act
No. 33 of 1992 neither which nor any amending act thereof had provided for the
confiscation/forfeiture of a vehicle?
No
The appeal is
dismissed. I order no costs.
Judge of the Supreme Court
A. L. Siran
Gooneratne, J
I Agree Judge
of the Supreme Court
Arjuna
Obeysekere, J
I Agree Judge
of the Supreme Court
In the matter of an Appeal in terms of Article 128 of the Constitution read with Section 9(a) of the High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) Act No. 19 of 1990.
Officer-In-Charge, Police Station, Wennappuwa.
Complainant
SC Appeal No: 101/2012 HCA Appeal No: 11/2011
MC Marawila Case No: 47051/C/X
Vs.
Nishantha Gamage
No. 34/A, Meda Katukenda, Dankotuwa.
Accused
Hetti Achchige Anton Sujeewa Perera No. 30/01, Bolawatta Road, Dankotuwa.
Claimant
And between
Hetti Achchige Anton Sujeewa Perera No. 30/11, Bolawatta Road, Dankotuwa.
Claimant-Appellant
Vs.
1. Hon. The Attorney General
Attorney General’s Department, Colombo 12.
Respondent
2. Officer-In-Charge, Police Station, Wennappuwa.
Complainant-Respondent
3. Nishantha Gamage
No. 34/A, Meda Katukenda, Dankotuwa.
Accused-Respondent
And between
Hetti Achchige Anton Sujeewa Perera No. 30/01, Bolawatta Road, Dankotuwa.
Claimant-Appellant-Appellant
Vs.
1. Hon. The Attorney General
Attorney General’s Department, Colombo 12.
Respondent-Respondent
2. Officer-In-Charge, Police Station, Wennappuwa.
Complainant-Respondent-Respondent
3. Nishantha Gamage
No. 34/A, Meda Katukenda, Dankotuwa.
Accused-Respondent-Respondent
Before : Priyantha Jayawardena PC, J
A. L. Shiran Gooneratne, J Arjuna Obeyesekere, J
Counsel : K. A. Upul Anuradha Wickramaratne for the Claimant-Appellant-Appellant.
Anoopa De Silva, DSG for the Complainant-Respondent-Respondent.
Argued on : 30th November, 2021
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