Criminal proceedings depend fundamentally on lawful investigations. Such investigations must be conducted by duly authorized officers, aimed at ascertaining the truth, identifying perpetrators, apprehending them, and gathering admissible material to be converted into judicial evidence.
Presentation of evidence founded upon investigative material (material that has the potential of being converted into judicial evidence at the trial) collected in the course of an unlawfully conducted investigation can pollute the findings of the trial court and its verdict and thereby render such finding unlawful.
Summary of the selected passages
The judgment explores
the intrinsic link between the right to a fair trial, lawful investigations,
and the institution of criminal proceedings. Justice Mark Fernando in Wijepala
v. Attorney General emphasized that Article 13(3) guarantees not just legal representation but “anything and everything” necessary for a fair
trial—underscoring its expansive and indefinable nature. A fair trial must be
assessed on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Criminal proceedings
depend fundamentally on lawful investigations. Such investigations must be
conducted by duly authorized officers, aimed at ascertaining the truth,
identifying perpetrators, apprehending them, and gathering admissible material
to be converted into judicial evidence. Decisions by prosecutorial authorities
such as the Attorney General or the Commission to Investigate Allegations of
Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) must therefore be founded on investigative
material collected lawfully, impartially, and in good faith. Instituting
proceedings for collateral purposes or on the basis of unlawful investigations
infringes Article 12 and undermines the rule of law.
Sri Lankan precedent (R.P.
Wijesiri v. Attorney General) confirms that an indictment without lawful
investigation is itself unlawful, a view endorsed by Justices Parinda
Ranasinghe and Abdul Cader. Both the Attorney General and CIABOC are bound by
the same principle. Investigations must not only be lawful but also
fair—ensuring suspects are informed of allegations, allowed to present their
position, and treated humanely. Indian Supreme Court jurisprudence similarly
stresses that fair investigation is an integral component of Article 21’s right
to a fair trial.
Finally, the Court
turned to the contentious issue of “traps” versus “entrapment.” While traps are
lawful investigative techniques in bribery cases, entrapment—where crime is
induced by investigators—raises serious concerns of legality and fairness. The distinction
is crucial to uphold integrity in the criminal justice system.
An excerpt from the
judgment.
[SC TAB 1A and 1B/2020]
- Page 116 of 145 In Wijepala v. Attorney General [(2001) 1 Sri L.R. 46] Mark
Fernando, J. observed that Article 13(3) “not only entitles an accused to a
right to legal representation at a trial before a competent court, but also to
a fair trial, and that includes anything and everything necessary for a fair
trial.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it is seen that
Justice Mark Fernando has by the use of the term ‘anything and everything’
indicated the impossibility of defining the concept of a fair trial and
exhaustively describing the constituent ingredients of a fair trial. He has
observed the expansive nature of the concept of a fair trial.
Indeed, what amounts to
a fair trial would be extremely difficult to define. It is only a series of
judgments on this matter that would give rise to a comprehensive description of
the concept of a fair trial and illustrate a definitive list of the constituent
ingredients of the concept. Whether or not an accused has been denied a fair
trial must be determined upon a consideration of the attendant facts and
circumstances of the case in comparison with the requirements of a fair trial.
Link between the right
to a fair trial, a lawful investigation and the institution of criminal
proceedings It is noteworthy that both the institution of criminal proceedings
and the conduct of criminal prosecutions are founded upon the conduct of
criminal and forensic investigations.
A criminal
investigation can be described as a legally regulated process, which is
required to be conducted by officials who possess the legal authority to
conduct such a process. The primary objectives for which a criminal
investigation is conducted, are as follows: (a) To ascertain the truth
pertaining to the information, complaint or allegation that an offence has been
committed (i.e. whether in fact an offence has been committed). (b) If the
investigation reveals that in fact an offence has been committed, ascertaining
the identity of the perpetrator. (c) Apprehending the perpetrator. (d)
Collecting ‘investigative material’ that would have the potential of being
admissible against such perpetrator in a court of law, by converting such
material into ‘judicial evidence’ (oral, documentary and technical), so that
criminal proceedings could be instituted against the perpetrator, and upon
successful prosecution of the perpetrator, he could be convicted for committing
the offence and be appropriately punished.
It must be noted that
the function of the Attorney General with regard to the institution of criminal
proceedings (following a consideration of investigative material) has been
conferred on him by [SC TAB 1A and 1B/2020] - Page 117 of 145 statute (the
written law). A decision on the institution of criminal proceedings has a
direct bearing on the legal rights and interests of both the suspect / accused
(alleged offender) and the relevant victim of crime. Therefore, this function
of the Attorney General should be viewed from the perspectives of principles of
public law.
Subject to the
exception provided by section 24 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act (as amended
by Act No. 16 of 2008), the statutory function of instituting criminal
proceedings against alleged offenders is regulated by section 393 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure Act (CCPA). With regard to offences that are required to
be investigated into by the police, the CCPA requires the decision of the
Attorney General on the institution of criminal proceedings to be founded upon
an investigation conducted by the police in terms of the law.
Thus, with regard to an
offence investigated into by the police, a decision on the institution of
criminal proceedings by the Attorney General must be founded upon an
intra-vires, independent, impartial, neutral, good faith and objective
consideration of investigative material relating to an investigation conducted
by the police in a lawful manner. The same principle applies to the function of
the CIABOC pertaining to the institution of criminal proceedings by it.
It needs hardly be
mentioned that the institution of criminal proceedings by either the
Attorney-General or the CIABOC for whatever collateral purposes of itself or
any other person, would be unlawful and amount to an infringement of Article 12
of the Constitution.
If investigators are
permitted to conduct investigations in a manner contrary to law, it would
amount to a serious afront to the rule of law and will affect the legality of
the institution of criminal proceedings. Similarly, it will affect the
integrity of the criminal justice system and frustrate the achievement of
objectives of criminal justice.
It can result in
persons suspected of committing offences being deprived of their fundamental
rights, the truth being suppressed, and accused persons being unfairly
prosecuted. It can give rise to innocent persons being investigated into and
actual perpetrators of crime being shielded from criminal justice. In addition
to the underlying rationale behind outlawing unlawful investigations, from a
public law perspective, using investigative material gathered through such an
unlawfully conducted investigation to found a decision on the institution of
criminal proceedings would be manifestly unlawful.
In R.P. Wijesiri v. The
Attorney General [(1980) 2 Sri L.R. 317], Justice Parinda Ranasinghe (as His
Lordship was then) as a Judge of the Court of Appeal, considered the vexed
question of (in the circumstances of the case examined by that Court), the legality
of an indictment preferred by the Attorney General to the High Court. His
Lordship considered whether, even if the Attorney General had the statutory
power to prefer an indictment to the High Court, such indictment should have
[SC TAB 1A and 1B/2020] been preceded by a ‘lawful investigation’. While
answering this question in the affirmative, Justice Ranasinghe observed the
necessity for and the importance of a legally valid investigation being
conducted by the Police into an offence, before criminal proceedings are
instituted by the Attorney General.
He observed that the
importance of commencing proceedings before a Court in a lawful manner cannot
be overstated (at page 339). In the circumstances of that case where the
Attorney General had directly instituted criminal proceedings against the
Petitioner for having committed an offence under section 480 of the Penal Code,
Justice Ranasinghe observed (at pages 346-7) that the indictment should have
been preceded by a lawful investigation, and that the absence of such a lawful
investigation preceding the indictment rendered the indictment also unlawful.
Justice Abdul Cader
pronouncing a separate judgment, while expressing agreement with the views
expressed by Justice Ranasinghe, held that in the circumstances of that case,
the High Court was not empowered to try the case, as the Police had not
conducted an investigation in a lawful manner in accordance with the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. He therefore ruled that the indictment
itself was unlawful. Thus, the law is clear. The institution of criminal
proceedings in the High Court by the Attorney General and by the Director
General of the CIAOBC (who is also conferred with the statutory power of
instituting criminal proceedings before the High Court by forwarding
indictment, on a direction to do so by the Commission) should be founded upon a
consideration of investigative material collected in the course of a lawful
investigation (which means an investigation conducted in terms of the
applicable law) and should be preceded by the conduct of such a lawful
investigation by competent law enforcement personnel.
All criminal
investigations must necessarily be conducted in terms of the law. As observed
by the Court of Appeal in R. P. Wijesiri v. The Attorney General, it is only
investigative material emanating from a ‘lawfully conducted investigation’ that
a prosecutorial authority such as the Attorney General should consider for the
purpose of deciding on the institution of criminal proceedings.
The same principle of
law would apply to the CIABOC. In terms of section 11 of the CIABOC Act, where
the material received by the Commission in the course of an investigation
conducted under the Act, discloses the commission of an offence by any person under
the Bribery Act or the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law, the
Commission shall direct the Director General to institute criminal proceedings
in the appropriate Court. It is implicit in section 11, that such investigation
should be lawful. Thus, this principle applies equally to both the
Attorney-General and the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or
Corruption. It logically flows from this principle of law, that, if upon a
consideration of investigative material, an affirmative [SC TAB 1A and 1B/2020]
- Page 119 of 145 decision is taken by either of these two prosecutorial
authorities to institute criminal proceedings against an alleged offender, the
corresponding prosecution can be conducted only based on material collected in
the course of a lawful investigation, and not otherwise.
It is necessary to
observe that basing prosecutorial decisions such as a decision on the
institution of criminal proceedings and framing of charges, and the conduct of
prosecutions relying upon material gathered in the course of an unlawful
investigation, would be a violation of the doctrine of the rule of law, and be
both unreliable and unfair. The resultant effect of an unlawful investigation
may be grave prejudice being caused to the accused and depriving him of this
fundamental right to a ‘fair trial’. Such a process would also amount to an
infringement of Article 12(1) of the Constitution (which may be identified as
the Constitutional guardian of the rule of law). Fair investigations Not only
should a criminal investigation be lawful, it must be fair as well; fair from
the perspective of both the victim of crime and the suspected perpetrator of
the offence. From the perspective of the suspect, a fair investigation will
include the investigator adhering to the following: (i) Explaining to the
suspect the allegation against him. (ii) Affording the suspect, a full
opportunity of presenting his position with regard to the allegation against
him and regarding persons who have made incriminatory statements and items of
incriminatory material gathered by investigators. (iii) Conducting
investigations based on exculpatory positions (if any) taken up by the suspect.
(iv) Treating the suspect in a humane manner, and in a manner that would not
infringe his fundamental rights. The investigator must always maintain an objective
mind and not view or treat the suspect with any prejudice. Ascertainment of the
truth in terms of the law should be the prime motive of the investigator, and
not to ‘develop a case against the suspect so that he could be somehow
prosecuted’. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab and Others, [(2009) AIR
SC 984] the Supreme Court of India has held that “… an accused is entitled to a
fair investigation. Fair investigation and fair trial are concomitant to the
preservation of fundamental right of an accused under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India”. [Emphasis added] In Sidhartha Vashisht alias Manu
Sharma v State (NCT of [SC TAB 1A and 1B/2020] - Page 120 of 145 Delhi),
[(2010) 6 SCC 1] the Supreme Court of India has observed that, “… the alleged
accused is entitled to fairness and true investigation and fair trial, and the
prosecution is expected to play a balanced role in the trial of a crime... The
investigation should be judicious, fair, transparent and expeditious to ensure
compliance to the basic rule of law”. If an investigation is conducted in an
unfair manner, the accused (when indicted) may be able to claim that he had
been deprived of his fundamental right to a fair trial. Further, by the conduct
of an unfair investigation, there is every reason to believe that the truth
will not surface, and in the circumstances, the public will lose confidence in
criminal law enforcement and in the criminal justice system. Unlawful
investigations There can be a strong causal nexus between on the one hand an
unlawfully conducted investigation and on the other hand the conviction of the
accused following a trial at which investigative material collected in the
course of such unlawful investigation had been presented (as judicial
evidence). Presentation of evidence founded upon investigative material
(material which has the potential of being converted into judicial evidence at
the trial) collected in the course of an unlawfully conducted investigation can
pollute the findings of the trial court and its verdict, and thereby render
such finding unlawful. That is primarily due to the possibility of highly
prejudicial evidence emanating from an unlawfully conducted investigation.
Therefore, if the prosecution had relied primarily on evidence collected in the
course of an unlawfully conducted investigation, it is possible that such
evidence resulted in causing substantial prejudice to the accused and therefore
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. If in fact a miscarriage of justice had
occurred, the conviction of the accused should be set aside on the premise that
the accused has been denied a fair trial. That is a situation where the outcome
of the case (conviction of the accused) has been inextricably interwoven with
the evidence presented by the prosecution which had emanated from an unlawfully
conducted investigation. Therefore, there has been a causal nexus between the
unlawfully conducted investigation and the conviction of the accused. However,
there may be situations where the investigation as a whole had been conducted
in a lawful manner, and only certain segments of it had been unlawfully
conducted. An example would be a lawful investigation into an incident of
murder, where a particular search had been conducted in an unlawful manner, and
a highly incriminatory item of real (physical) evidence having been found
during such unlawful search. In such instances, the Court would have to
carefully examine [SC TAB 1A and 1B/2020] - Page 121 of 145 and rule on the
impact of such unlawfully conducted portion(s) of the investigation. What was
the impact of the search having been conducted in an unlawful manner, on the
recovery of the relevant incriminatory item of real evidence? Was evidence
presented against the accused based on such unlawfully conducted segments of
the investigation? Was the testimonial narrative of the prosecution pertaining
to the recovery of such item, credible and trustworthy? Has the presentation of
material emanating from such unlawfully conducted segments of the
investigation, cause grave and irreparable prejudice to the accused resulting
in a miscarriage of justice? It is the answers to these questions, that will
enable the Court to determine whether in such instances (where only a part of
the investigation had been conducted unlawfully), the accused had been denied a
fair trial, and if so, whether the conviction should be set-aside. Conduct of
the investigation by officers of the CIABOC It is now necessary to consider
whether the investigation into the complaint made to the CIABOC by the virtual
complainant Nagarajah, had been conducted in a lawful manner. In this regard,
consideration of section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 15 of
1979 would provide a useful starting point. All offences – (a) under the Penal
Code, (b) under any other law unless otherwise specifically provided for in
that law or any other law, shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and
otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of this Code. [Emphasis added]
The offences for which the Appellants have been found ‘guilty’ of committing,
are offences under the Bribery Act. The Bribery Act presently does not contain
specific provisions pertaining to the conduct of investigations into offences
under the Act. [Prior to 1994, there were certain provisions, which were
repealed by Act No. 20 of 1994.] However, the Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Bribery or Corruption Act, No. 19 of 1994, which established the
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), has
vide section 3 of the Act, entrusted such Commission the statutory functions of
– (i) investigating allegations contained in communications made to the
Commission under section 4, and (ii) [SC TAB 1A and 1B/2020] - Page 122 of 145
where such investigation discloses the commission of any offence by any person
under the Bribery Act or the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law, No. 1
of 1975, directing the Director General for the Prevention of Bribery or
Corruption to institute criminal proceedings against such person in the
appropriate court. It would be seen that by section 5 of the CIABOC Act, the
CIABOC has been vested with certain powers of investigation. Therefore, the
Commission in the exercise of its statutory function of investigating the
alleged commission of certain offences (such as the offences the Appellants
were subsequently indicted of having committed) is entitled to exercise such
powers of investigation contained in section 5 of the CIABOC Act. However, vide
section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, unless specifically provided
in a particular law, an investigation at large should be conducted in the
manner provided for in such Code. To enable officers appointed to assist the
Commission to exercise powers of investigation contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure Act, section 18(2) of the CIABOC Act provides that the Director
General for the Prevention of Bribery or Corruption (referred to as the
‘Director General of the Commission’ during the hearing of this Appeal) and
every officer appointed to assist the Commission shall be deemed to be ‘peace
officers’ within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. A careful
consideration of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act reveals that the statutory
regulation of the conduct of an investigation is primarily found in Chapter XI
of the Act. As observed by Justice Parinda Ranasinghe in R.P. Wijesiri v. The
Attorney-General, Chapter XI contains vital powers of investigation, provisions
that are sacrosanct and are invaluable safeguards against oppressive and
unlawful forms of investigations. However, it is important to note that there
are several very important provisions pertaining to the conduct of criminal
investigations outside Chapter XI of the Code as well. They are, the (i) power
to conduct search operations (sections 24 to 31), (ii) powers of arrest of
suspects (sections 23, 32, 33, 34, and 42), and (iii) power to hold an arrested
person in custody (sections 37 and 43A). Additionally, when police officers
conduct investigations, they are empowered under the provisions of the Police
Ordinance as well. Therefore, restricting the powers of investigation to
Chapter XI of the Code would not be correct. A further examination of the
provisions of the CIABOC Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure Act reveals
that though the said laws suitably empower any Peace Officer or an
Officer-in-Charge of Police Station (in the context of investigations into
offences under the Penal Code and various other laws containing offences which
may be investigated into by the Police) and the Commission (in the [SC TAB 1A
and 1B/2020] - Page 123 of 145 context of offences under the Bribery Act and
the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law), the two laws in conjunction do
not exhaustively contain provisions of law that would regulate the conduct of
investigations. Neither of these two laws stipulate the exact modus operandi
that may be adopted when conducting an investigation. For valid reasons,
determining the exact manner in which an investigation should be conducted has
been left to the ingenuity of the relevant investigators based on circumstances
relating to each investigation. The manner of conducting an investigation is to
be determined keeping in mind a host of factors such as the nature of the
offence, the circumstances pertaining to the commission of the offence that is
required to be investigated into, and the need to collect sufficient
investigative material that would enable the launching of a successful
prosecution. Subject to the provisions of the afore-stated laws and
circumscribed by such laws, investigation officers have been vested with
considerable discretionary authority to determine the exact manner in which the
investigation ought to be conducted and implement the conceptualized
investigation strategy in a lawful manner. Particularly with regard to complex
crimes such as premeditated murder, bribery and corruption, money laundering,
and drug trafficking, law enforcement officers would need to adopt complex
investigative methodology to detect crime and to gather evidence. Of course,
when designing such investigation strategy and implementing it, investigation
officers would have to abide specifically by the applicable provisions of the
afore-stated two laws and generally by the rule of law, which would include
recognizing and respecting the Fundamental Rights of suspects and the rights
and entitlements of victims of crime and witnesses. Indeed, every investigation
must be conducted in a lawful, impartial, fair, prompt and comprehensive
manner, with the view to ascertaining the truth. Laying of a ‘trap’ and
‘entrapment’ as investigative techniques and their legality Throughout the
hearing of this Appeal, there was considerable debate about the investigative
technique adopted by CIABOC officials which resulted in the arrest of the
appellants. While learned President’s Counsel for the Appellants submitted that
what took place at the instance of officers of the CIABOC was an ‘entrapment’,
learned Deputy Solicitor General for the Respondents submitted that the investigative
technique adopted by officers of the CIABOC did not amount to ‘entrapment’ and
was not unlawful. Learned counsel also debated whether the modus operandi
adopted by CIABOC officers was merely ‘laying of a trap’ or ‘an entrapment’.
Therefore, it is now necessary to consider (i) what a ‘trap’ is as opposed to
an ‘entrapment’, (ii) whether the modus operandi of ‘entrapment’ as alleged to
have been adopted by the investigation officers of the Commission in the
instant case, amounted to an ‘entrapment’ (iii) whether such ‘entrapment’ is
‘unlawful’ or ‘illegal’,................................
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