Principle of Law A public statement by a Member of Parliament alleging widespread corruption among judges and lawyers amounts to contempt of court under Article 105(3) of the Constitution, as it undermines public confidence in the judiciary. The Supreme Court’s contempt jurisdiction extends to acts committed both within court and outside court, provided such acts tend to obstruct or interfere with the due administration of justice.

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Sunil Perera v. Ranjan Ramanayake

Supreme Court of Sri Lanka – SC/Rule/1/2018
[2021] 1 Sri Lanka Law Reports 215

Before: De Abrew, J., Malalgoda, J., and Surasena, J.
Date of Judgment: 12 January 2021

Principle of Law

A public statement by a Member of Parliament alleging widespread corruption among judges and lawyers amounts to contempt of court under Article 105(3) of the Constitution, as it undermines public confidence in the judiciary. The Supreme Court’s contempt jurisdiction extends to acts committed both within court and outside court, provided such acts tend to obstruct or interfere with the due administration of justice.

Facts

  • On 21 August 2017, the respondent (a Member of Parliament and non-Cabinet Minister) made a public statement to the media outside Temple Trees, claiming that 95% of judges and lawyers in Sri Lanka are corrupt. The statement was widely publicised through television networks.

  • The respondent subsequently repeated similar statements on multiple occasions outside the Supreme Court premises (14.12.2017, 23.03.2018, 04.06.2018, 18.06.2018, and 05.09.2018), explicitly refusing to withdraw his words even if it meant imprisonment for life.

  • Upon a complaint, the Supreme Court issued a Rule under Article 105(3) calling upon him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

  • In his defence, the respondent claimed that the reference to “judges” was an unintentional slip of the tongue, and that he had intended to criticise only corrupt lawyers.

Held

  1. The respondent admitted that he used the word “judges” in his initial statement.

  2. His failure to correct this alleged “mistake” in any of his subsequent statements, and his repeated refusal to withdraw the remark, demonstrated that his intention was in fact to refer to judges as well as lawyers.

  3. By expressly declaring that the majority of judges in Sri Lanka are corrupt, the respondent’s remarks included Supreme Court judges themselves and thereby directly attacked the integrity of the judicial system.

  4. Article 105(3) of the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of court, whether committed in court or elsewhere.

  5. Contempt of court is a criminal offence requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt. The charge was proved against the respondent to this standard.

  6. The objection that contempt proceedings could not be maintained, or that procedure under the Civil Procedure Code should have been followed, was rejected: the respondent had been afforded a fair trial with full opportunity to present his defence.

  7. His conduct went beyond fair criticism of the judiciary and amounted to scandalising the court and eroding public confidence in the administration of justice.

Sentence

  • The respondent, Ranjan Ramanayake, was convicted of contempt of court under Article 105(3).

  • He was sentenced to four years’ rigorous imprisonment.

Key Precedents Cited

  • Nagalingam v. Lakshman De Mel (78 NLR 231) – Jurisdictional objections must be taken at the inception.

  • The King v. Kitchilan (45 NLR 82) – Procedural objections raised belatedly cannot invalidate proceedings.

  • In Re Bramblevale Ltd. [1970] 1 Ch 128 – Contempt of court is criminal in nature and punishable by imprisonment.

  • Croos v. Dabrera [1990] 1 SLR 205 – Burden of proof in contempt is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

  • Perera v. The King (1951 AC 482, Privy Council) – Honest criticism on matters of public importance may not amount to contempt; distinguished on facts.

Significance

This judgment reaffirms that:

  • The judiciary’s integrity is central to the rule of law, and public statements that scandalise judges constitute contempt.

  • The Supreme Court’s contempt jurisdiction is plenary and extends beyond acts committed within courtrooms.

  • Politicians and public figures bear a special responsibility to exercise restraint in their public utterances concerning the judiciary.

✅ This headnote is structured so that a lawyer, student, or lay reader can quickly grasp the facts, issues, holdings, and significance of the case without reading the entire 15+ page judgment.

Would you like me to also prepare a comparative commentary linking this case with earlier Sri Lankan contempt decisions (In the Matter of Attorney-at-Law for False Statement 1993, Rubert Appuhamy 2007, Batashoe 2006)—to trace how the courts have expanded or restricted contempt powers over time?

ChatGPT said:

Headnote (Exhaustive)

Sunil Perera v. Ranjan Ramanayake

Supreme Court of Sri Lanka — SC/Rule/1/2018
[2021] 1 Sri Lanka Law Reports 215
Bench: De Abrew J., Malalgoda J., Surasena J.
Argued: 25 August 2020 Decided: 12 January 2021
Counsel: Rasika Dissanayake with Sadun Senadhipathi (for petitioner); M.A. Sumanthiran, P.C., with Viran Corea and J.C. Thambiah (for respondent); Sarath Jayamanne, P.C., A.S.G., with Suharshi Herath, S.S.C. (for Attorney-General)

Core Principle of Law

  1. Scope of contempt jurisdiction (Art. 105(3)): The Supreme Court, as a superior court of record, may punish contempt committed “in court or elsewhere.” A public allegation that “the majority” of judges are corrupt—especially when persisted in—scandalises the court and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice, constituting criminal contempt.

  2. Nature and standard of proof: Contempt is an offence of a criminal character requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt; the Court must be satisfied that the words used, viewed in context, tend to interfere with or obstruct the due administration of justice.

  3. Fair criticism vs. scandalising: While honest fair criticism of judicial acts on matters of public importance may not amount to contempt, blanket imputations of corruption against “judges” cross the line and are punishable.

  4. Procedure: So long as the accused is served with the Rule, the charge is read, a not-guilty plea is recorded, and the party receives a full opportunity to test the prosecution evidence, cross-examine, and adduce defence, the Court’s process satisfies fairness; Chapter LXV CPC forms need not be slavishly followed where the Court affords a procedure that is at least as protective.

Facts & Procedural History

  • First statement (21 Aug 2017): Outside Temple Trees, after a parliamentary group meeting, the respondent (then MP and State/Non-Cabinet Minister) told media that “the majority in Sri Lanka are corrupted judges, corrupted lawyers; they work for money.” The statement aired on multiple evening news bulletins (e.g., Sirasa “News 1st”).

  • Subsequent statements (14 Dec 2017; 23 Mar 2018; 4 Jun 2018; 18 Jun 2018; 5 Sep 2018): In the premises of the Supreme Court (outside the building) the respondent publicly refused to withdraw, stating he would not recant even if imprisoned for life; on 14.12.2017 he added he had spoken “about these judges.”

  • Rule & plea: Upon a complaint by a member of the public, a Rule issued on 8 Aug 2018 under Art. 105(3); the respondent pleaded not guilty.

  • Evidence: Registrar of the Supreme Court proved service of the Rule and plea; journalists/cameramen from Sirasa TV and Hiru TV produced videos (P1, P3, P5, P7) and transcripts (P2, P4, P6) capturing the impugned words and later reaffirmations; videos were played in open court.

  • Defence: Under oath, the respondent conceded he used “judges” on 21.08.2017 but claimed it was a slip of the tongue and that he intended to refer only to “corrupt lawyers.” He accepted he never corrected that “mistake” in later statements.

Issues

  1. Whether the respondent’s words and subsequent conduct amounted to contempt of court by scandalising the judiciary.

  2. Whether the Supreme Court’s contempt power under Art. 105(3) extends to statements made outside court premises, and in particular, whether jurisdiction depends on explicit reference to the Supreme Court as opposed to “judges” generally.

  3. Whether the Court’s process complied with fair trial requirements, and whether Chapter LXV CPC procedure (ss. 792–793) had to be applied verbatim.

  4. Whether the defence of “slip of the tongue” and asserted lack of intention regarding judges created a reasonable doubt.

Held (per curiam)

  1. Contempt proved beyond reasonable doubt. The first statement plainly included judges, and the respondent knew and repeatedly confirmed that meaning by his subsequent, defiant statements on 14.12.2017, 23.03.2018, 04.06.2018, 18.06.2018 and 05.09.2018. The asserted “slip” was inconsistent with his unwavering public stance.

  2. Jurisdiction — “in court or elsewhere.” Article 105(3) explicitly empowers the Supreme Court to punish contempt whether committed in court or elsewhere. A generalized allegation that “the majority of judges” are corrupt necessarily implicates Supreme Court judges, satisfying nexus to the Court’s authority and the administration of justice.

  3. Procedure and fairness. The respondent was served, charged, pleaded not guilty, and enjoyed full adversarial safeguards (cross-examination, defence evidence). The Court need not strictly adopt CPC Form No. 132 where its process already afforded equal or greater procedural protection.

  4. Fair criticism distinguished. Perera v. The King (1951 AC 482) protects honest criticism on public matters; unlike in Perera, the present case involved a sweeping, unparticularised attack impugning judicial integrity, eroding public confidence; hence not fair criticism.

  5. Conviction & sentence: The charge of contempt was affirmed and proved; the respondent was convicted and sentenced to four years’ rigorous imprisonment, and the warrant of committal directed.

Reasoning Highlights

  • Criminal character & standard of proof: Following In re Bramblevale [1970] 1 Ch 128 (Denning MR) and Croos v. Dabrera [1990] 1 SLR 205, contempt is criminal; proof beyond reasonable doubt applies.

  • Objective tendency to interfere: The test is whether the conduct tends to interfere with the administration of justice; scandalising remarks about “most judges” undercut public trust, a core institutional value essential to courts’ function.

  • Persistence negates “slip”: Even if a misstatement was initially possible, the failure to correct coupled with repeated re-affirmation (including willingness to accept long imprisonment) demonstrates intention and aggravates contempt.

  • Belated jurisdictional objection rejected: Jurisdictional objections must be taken at inception; raised only in final submissions, they were too late and, in any event, meritless given Art. 105(3).

  • Procedural sufficiency: The Court read the charge, recorded a not-guilty plea, and conducted an open trial; thus, even if CPC ss. 792–793 were invoked, the Court’s process was no less protective, meeting fairness.

Disposition

  • Rule affirmed; respondent convicted of contempt under Art. 105(3); sentence: four (4) years’ rigorous imprisonment; Registrar directed to issue warrant.

Authorities Relied Upon / Distinguished

  • Nagalingam v. Lakshman De Mel 78 NLR 231 — timing of jurisdictional objections; participation cures late challenge.

  • The King v. Kitchilan 45 NLR 82 — belated procedural objections; appellate discretion where no prejudice.

  • In re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] 1 Ch 128 — contempt is criminal, imprisonment available.

  • Croos v. Dabrera [1990] 1 SLR 205 — standard of proof in contempt is beyond reasonable doubt.

  • Perera v. The King (1951) AC 482 (PC) — honest criticism may not be contempt; distinguished on facts.

Key Takeaways (for ready application)

  1. Art. 105(3) is plenary: The Supreme Court may punish contempt inside or outside court; public scandalising of the judiciary is actionable.

  2. Mens rea inferred from conduct: Persistence and refusal to retract can establish intention notwithstanding a later claim of “slip.”

  3. Criminal safeguards apply: Expect a criminal standard of proof; the Court’s own process may satisfy or exceed CPC summary-procedure protections.

  4. Limits of speech about courts: Generalised accusations of judicial corruption are not “fair criticism.” Specific, reasoned critique of judicial acts may be protected; attacks on integrity are not.

  5. Practical guidance for counsel / public figures: If a misstatement about judges is made, prompt correction and apology matter; repetition aggravates and will likely lead to conviction and custodial sentence.

Related Authority (context on contempt for false statements to the Supreme Court)

The Supreme Court has also held that deliberately false statements and affidavits aimed at misleading the Court amount to contempt, reinforcing the same institutional-integrity rationale (SC Contempt No. 03/16, 15 July 2021, Aluwihare J.; Murdu Fernando J.; P. Padman Surasena J.). 

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