Case Title: Victor Ivon v. Sarath, N., Silva, Attorney General and Others

 Case Title: Victor Ivon v. Sarath, N., Silva, Attorney General and Others

Case Number: SC APPLICATION NO. 89/98

Decided Date: 1998-04-03

Source: Sri Lanka Law Reports

Book Reference: 1998 01 SLR 340

Nature: Alleged abuse of prosecutorial discretion.

Issues: Review of the Attorney-General's power to file (or not file) an indictment for criminal defamation, Pendency of proceedings in another court, Prima facie case for review, Existence of contract, Breach of contract

Summary: The case between Victor Ivon (petitioner) and Sarath N. Silva, Attorney-General and another (respondents), addressed the reviewability of the Attorney-General’s discretionary power to file indictments for criminal defamation in the context of constitutional rights, particularly freedom of speech and expression. It was determined that while the Attorney-General’s decision to grant or refuse sanction to prosecute is a broad discretionary power, this power must be exercised within constitutional boundaries and is subject to judicial scrutiny where an infringement of fundamental rights under Article 126 is alleged. Examining statutory provisions and the sufficiency of prima facie evidence, the findings established that the case presented did not warrant judicial intervention or review of the prosecutorial discretion exercised. The petition was refused, underscoring the principle that the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney-General is not absolute but judicial review is available where fundamental rights are implicated. This decision relied upon relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, reinforcing the safeguards against arbitrary exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

Fernando J. —  The principal judgment determined that the Attorney-General’s power to sanction or proceed with indictments for criminal defamation constitutes a discretionary power, defined by statutory and constitutional frameworks. It was reasoned that this discretion, although broad, is not unfettered and remains subject to judicial review when allegations of fundamental rights violations arise under Article 126. Upon analyzing the evidence and statutory requirements, it was held that the petitioner failed to establish a sufficient prima facie case warranting judicial intervention, resulting in the petition being refused.

Wadugodapitiya J. —  agreed with Fernando J.

Bandaranayake J. —  agreed with Fernando J.

All three judges were aligned in concluding that the Attorney-General’s discretion is reviewable only when a prima facie violation of fundamental rights is established; in the instant case, such threshold was not met. The judgment of Fernando J. constituted the determination of the court, with Wadugodapitiya J. and Bandaranayake J. agreeing with its reasoning and conclusion, thereby refusing the petition.

Judges: Fernando J.; Wadugodapitiya J.; Bandaranayake J.