section 22(6) of the Rent Act mandates a one-year notice (later amended to six months) as a condition precedent for termination of tenancy. Failure to comply renders the action null in limine.

 786

2025

Present: Janak De Silva, J., Mahinda Samayawardhena, J., and Arjuna Obeyesekere, J.

ABDUL CADER SABURA UMMA v. KRISHNAMOORTHIE AND OTHERS

S.C. Appeal No. 112/2014 – H.C.C.A. Batticaloa/BC/06/2007 – D.C. Batticaloa 4413/96

Decided on: 10th October 2025

Rent Act — Validity of notice to quit — Requirement of one year’s notice under section 22(6) of the Rent Act, No. 7 of 1972 — Plaintiff’s burden to terminate tenancy in compliance with statute — Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code — Cause of action and omission of remedy — Approbation and reprobation — Abuse of process and vexatious litigation.

 

Facts

 

The plaintiff filed an action in the District Court of Batticaloa seeking declaration of tenancy and ejectment of the defendants on the grounds of reasonable requirement and arrears of rent. The defendants admitted their tenancy but contended that the one-month notice to quit given by the plaintiff was invalid under section 22(6) of the Rent Act, which required one year’s notice. Both the District Court and the High Court of Civil Appeal dismissed the plaintiff’s action, holding that the tenancy had not been properly terminated.

 

In a previous case between the same parties, the defendants’ predecessors had held the property in trust for the plaintiff, who was required to repay a loan before obtaining reconveyance. The plaintiff had not made that payment but nonetheless instituted the present action treating the defendants as tenants.

 

The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on the questions of (a) whether the High Court erred in holding the respondents to be tenants despite denial of title, and (b) whether the notice to quit was valid.

 

Held 

Per Samayawardhena, J. — The appeal is dismissed.

The plaintiff cannot maintain an action for ejectment based on a one-month notice, as section 22(6) of the Rent Act mandates a one-year notice (later amended to six months) as a condition precedent for termination of tenancy. Failure to comply renders the action null in limine.

The plaintiff’s conduct amounted to approbation and reprobation, having treated the defendants as tenants in the present case while alleging ownership disputes in earlier proceedings. The Court observed that the plaintiff’s omission to seek ejectment in the earlier action, as required by section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, barred her from pursuing the same cause later.

Her failure to discharge obligations under the earlier trust arrangement, coupled with repeated litigation, was an abuse of process, intended to harass the defendants.

 

Principles and Precedents (in nutshell)

 

Section 22(6) of the Rent Act, No. 7 of 1972 — The statutory requirement of one year’s notice (now six months) is mandatory, not procedural; absence of valid notice is fatal to the maintainability of an ejectment action.

 

Fernando v. Abeysekera (1989 1 Sri LR 151): notice period under Rent Act is a condition precedent.

 

Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code — A plaintiff must include the whole claim arising from one cause of action; failure to seek ejectment in an earlier case precludes a subsequent action.

 

Muttiah v. De Mel (1948 50 NLR 536): a plaintiff who omits a remedy cannot later pursue it.

 

Approbation and Reprobation — A party cannot affirm and disaffirm the same transaction or relationship in successive proceedings.

 

Perera v. Mendis (1992 2 Sri LR 140): a litigant must be consistent in legal stance.

 

Tenancy and Ownership Distinction — Tenancy does not require the landlord to be owner; it is sufficient if the tenant occupies under a recognised rental arrangement.

 

Fernando v. Samarasinha (1976 78 NLR 121): possession under tenancy subsists independently of ownership.

 

Abuse of Process — Instituting repetitive or inconsistent actions constitutes misuse of judicial machinery.

 

Ranasinghe v. Premalal (2000 2 Sri LR 322): vexatious actions attract dismissal with costs.

 

Held Further

 

Where the plaintiff herself treated the defendants as tenants, she cannot later question that relationship. The courts below correctly dismissed the action for non-compliance with statutory notice and for want of good faith. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that compliance with the Rent Act is a strict statutory obligation, not a matter of discretion.

Decision

 Appeal dismissed with costs.

The notice to quit being invalid, the action was incompetent in law. The plaintiff was further admonished for engaging in vexatious litigation and for misuse of the Rent Act procedure.

 

 

JUDGMENT